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In Federalist 51, James Madison offered what has become the canonical ac-
count of how the separation of powers would pit branch against branch for the 
greater good. The officials of an institution would act on behalf of their institution 
for the Constitution to function properly. In Madison’s account, ensuring the pres-
ence of the right quantum of institutional loyalties would serve as a durable and 
plausible mechanism for enforcing institutional boundaries and ensuring a stable 
constitutional order. But modern scholars take a more skeptical view of his theory. 
This Article reconsiders the Madisonian concept of institutional loyalty as an object 
of analysis for constitutional scholars and jurists. Our core thesis is that institu-
tional loyalty can be identified, evaluated, and even elicited through conscious and 
careful institutional design. We first provide a definition of institutional loyalty and 
situate the concept in the American constitutional past and present. We then mar-
shal evidence that institutional loyalty may well have been decisive in some contem-
porary interbranch dynamics, even if its effects are inconstant and asymmetrical. In 
particular, we suggest that loyalties’ effects in the executive and judiciary are greater 
than their effect in the legislative context. We caution, however, that it is a mistake 
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to view institutional loyalties as a constitutional end in themselves. Rather, institu-
tional loyalty can promote or undermine structural constitutional goals, depending 
on the circumstances. Calibrating the appropriate mix of such loyalties across the 
branches therefore presents a considerable, if unavoidable, array of challenges. To 
that end, the Article offers a taxonomy of causal mechanisms by which institutional 
loyalty can be generated within each of the three branches. Working branch by 
branch, the Article identifies examples of institutional reforms capable of modifying 
institutional loyalty in ways that could promote widely shared constitutional ends. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution’s separation of powers implies the existence 
of three distinct and separate branches.1 Each was initially imag-
ined to act “as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment 
or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”2 In 
 
 1 See, for example, Humphrey’s Executor v United States, 295 US 602, 629 (1935) 
(“The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of gov-
ernment entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of 
the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question.”). 
 2 Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam). See also Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833, 860 (1986) (Brennan dissenting) (“In order to 
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a famous passage in Federalist 51, James Madison amplified this 
pivotal causal mechanism. “Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition,” he explained, and “[t]he interest of the man must be 
connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”3 In this key 
passage, Madison invoked the institutional loyalty of officials—
their tendency to identify with and to act in ways that promote 
their home institution—as a central dynamo of branch autonomy 
and healthy interbranch friction. Relying on these loyalties, he 
predicted that fractious interactions between branches fomented 
by this institutional loyalty would, in net, enhance individual lib-
erty.4 At the same time, Madison recognized that voters would at 
times be driven by partisan, ideological, or even material “pas-
sions” that clouded their respect for these institutional bounda-
ries.5 In these moments, he suggested, officials’ loyalty to their 
home institutions would shelter valued institutional norms 
against the fickle tides of popular sentiment.6 
A recent wave of empirically informed and theoretically 
sophisticated scholarship has challenged the significance of this 
optimistic Madisonian equilibrium. This scholarship has power-
fully questioned the Framers’ optimistic account of rivalrous 
branches led by zealous empire builders. Particularly now that 
 
prevent [ ] tyranny, the Framers devised a governmental structure composed of three dis-
tinct branches.”). 
 3 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed) (“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in 
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the 
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”). 
 4 See id at 348 (“[S]eparate and distinct exercise of the different powers of govern-
ment . . . is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty.”). See also 
Bond v United States, 564 US 211, 222 (2011) (“[S]eparation-of-powers principles . . . pro-
tect each branch of government from incursion by the others . . . [and] protect the individ-
ual.”); Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 742 (2008) (“The Framers’ inherent distrust of 
governmental power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated 
powers among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make Govern-
ment accountable but also to secure individual liberty.”). For a similar recent statement 
to the same effect, see National Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning, 134 S Ct 2550, 
2559 (2014) (“We recognize, of course, that the separation of powers can serve to safeguard 
individual liberty.”). 
 5 Federalist 49 (Madison), in The Federalist 338, 343 (cited in note 3) (“The passions 
. . . of the public, would sit in judgment. . . . [M]ere declarations in the written constitution, 
are not sufficient to restrain the several departments. . . . [O]ccasional appeals to the peo-
ple would be neither a proper nor an effectual provision, for that purpose.”). 
 6 See  Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Law, 110 
Colum L Rev 479, 498 (2010) (lauding such separations as ways of enhancing legality and 
rights); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dan-
gerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L J 2314, 2317 (2006). 
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our two political parties are ideologically homogeneous, the mod-
ern position contends, our national political-party system has 
“tied the power and political fortunes of government officials to 
issues and elections” and thereby fostered “a set of incentives that 
rendered these officials largely indifferent to the powers and in-
terests of the branches per se.”7 They predict that officials will 
have an “array” of interests, but rarely will these interests 
“strongly correlate[ ] with increasing the scope or wealth of gov-
ernment institutions.”8 The result is that partisan and ideological 
loyalty often eclipse institutional loyalty both as a practical and 
as an analytic matter.9 
The ascendancy of this important and insightful body of work 
means that the idea of distinctively institutional loyalties re-
ceives short shrift in the constitutional-law literature. Attention 
to the effects of intense partisan and ideological loyalties (which 
we do not deny) have crowded out descriptive questions of why 
institutional loyalties might persist and why they matter 
(whether for good or ill) when they do persist, as well as the nor-
mative question of how to generate appropriate institutional loy-
alties when they are desirable.10 It is against this backdrop that 
 
 7 Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
Harv L Rev 2311, 2323 (2006). 
 8 Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv 
L Rev 915, 920 (2005). See also Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, Law for States: 
International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1791, 1832 (2009) 
(“Not all of the structural and political mechanisms Madison envisioned have worked in 
the ways he anticipated or hoped.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Posi-
tive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv L Rev 657, 670 (2011) (“Madison 
never explained why the branches of government, or the state and federal governments, 
would reliably have political incentives at odds with one another—why they would tend to 
compete rather than cooperate or collude.”). For endorsements of this view by other schol-
ars, see Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and 
Balances, 18 U Pa J Const L 419, 430 (2015) (“[A] system intended to channel competition 
through the political branches actually channels it through the political parties.”); Bruce 
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv L Rev 1737, 1809 n 222 (2007) (describing 
the parties-not-powers theory as a “breakthrough” and an “essential reference point”). 
 9 See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and 
the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv L Rev 411, 443 (2012) (“[T]he Madisonian model of 
interbranch rivalry is especially inaccurate during times of unified government.”); Levinson 
and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2329 (cited in note 7) (“[W]hen government is unified and 
the engine of party competition is removed from the internal structure of government, we 
should expect interbranch competition to dissipate. Intraparty cooperation (as a strategy 
of interparty competition) smoothes over branch boundaries and suppresses the central 
dynamic assumed in the Madisonian model.”). 
 10 The scholars that have remained loyal to institutional loyalty are therefore often 
left playing defense against the skeptical modern position that institutional loyalties are 
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we aim to reevaluate institutional loyalty—the psychological cor-
nerstone of a larger Madisonian political logic—as an object of 
sustained analysis in constitutional scholarship. In the service of 
that larger project, we advance here three points—one descrip-
tive, one analytic, and finally a normative claim. 
First, as a descriptive matter, we argue that the behavior of 
federal officials cannot always be explained simply by partisan or 
ideological motives. The current working of our constitutional 
system evinces the lingering influence of institutional loyalty of 
the kind Madison anticipated, particularly in the executive and 
judicial contexts. Officials may variously support an increase or a 
decrease in the power of their institution but often enough be mo-
tivated by a loyalty to the best interests of their institution. We 
do not claim, to be clear, that such loyalties are the most im-
portant or consequential element of our constitutional system. 
More modestly, we suggest that they persist to an extent that 
warrants more careful theorizing. Our aim here is not to measure 
their pervasiveness: it is to show that they operate at least occa-
sionally in important policy consequence—and as such are worth 
identifying, defining, and exploring in terms of the institutional 
design of our constitutional system. 
This descriptive claim can be illustrated with three examples, 
each drawn from a different branch, in which officials’ behavior is 
difficult to explain exclusively by partisan or ideological 
motivations.  
First, faced with a politically polarizing challenge in a presi-
dential election year to President Barack Obama’s signature 
healthcare legislation, Chief Justice John Roberts is alleged to 
 
relics of our constitutional past. Compare Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legisla-
tive Authority and the Separation of Powers 28–35 (Yale 2017) (criticizing Levinson and 
Pildes on the ground that “party discipline is by no means absolute in the American sys-
tem”), with Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Ac-
count of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 NYU L Rev 227, 227 (2016) (“[L]eading 
accounts . . . fail to capture the multidimensional nature of administrative control in which 
the constitutional branches (the old separation of powers) and the administrative rivals 
(the new separation of powers) all compete with one another to influence administrative 
governance.”). But see Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U Pa L Rev 715, 715, 
774 (2012) (“Congress has significantly more constitutional power than we are accustomed 
to seeing it exercise. . . . [A] possible explanation for congressional underutilization of its 
powers is that members of Congress are largely unconcerned with congressional power; 
their primary loyalty is to their party, not their branch.”). Our aim here is to systematize 
these hints. 
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have shifted his vote to support the legislation.11 Glossing his 
switch, journalist Jan Crawford observed that the chief justice “is 
keenly aware of his leadership role on the court, and he also is 
sensitive to how the court is perceived by the public.”12 Standard 
ideological or attitudinal models of judicial behavior do not offer 
a straightforward explanation of his vote, or his alleged shift.13 
While secure conclusions are difficult to reach, it is at least plau-
sible to think that concern about the Court as an institution fig-
ured large in the chief justice’s reasoning. 
 Second, during the presidencies of George W. Bush and 
Obama, many lawyers serving as cabinet officials and senior 
political appointees resisted White House initiatives in favor of 
positions motivated by allegiance to their agencies’ or offices’ 
legalistic institutional agenda. Attorney General John Ashcroft 
and his deputy James Comey, for example, resisted White House 
pressure to authorize a surveillance program they believed ultra 
vires.14 Similarly, senior lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) and the Department of Defense resisted Obama’s 2011 
military intervention in Libya on legalistic grounds, while State 
Department and White House lawyers defended it.15 
 Despite the different administrations involved, these examples 
involve officials resisting ideological or partisan ambitions on legal-
istic grounds when their home agency or department has an in-
terest in maintaining a legal constraint on the presidential agenda. 
Generalizing about these lawyers’ actions, former OLC lawyer 
Jack Goldsmith has explained, “A political appointee is a tempo-
rary steward in the institution in which she works, and is often 
moved to preserve the values and reputation of that institution,” 
even at the cost of compromising an administration’s immediate 
 
 11 Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law (CBS News, 
July 2, 2012), online at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched 
-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/2/ (visited Oct 19, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Jan Crawford, Discord at Supreme Court Is Deep, and Personal (CBS News, 
July 9, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/4B7J-6WKG (noting that Roberts broke with 
those who had assumed he would be an ideological ally). 
 14 See Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politiciz-
ing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?, Hearings before the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong, 1st Sess 216–17 (2007) (statement of James B. Comey, former deputy 
attorney general, Department of Justice). 
 15 See Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate (NY 
Times, June 17, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/73TJ-MDZY. 
2018] Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law 7 
 
policy goals.16 We take Goldsmith as a credible source for the 
idea that officials believe themselves to be “stewards” of their 
institution. 
 Third, over the course of the twentieth century, Congress has 
created a number of durable institutional structures that are not 
well explained in terms of the partisan or ideological interests of 
members. Foremost among these is the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 194617 (LRA). This Act “vigorously reasserted congressional 
oversight power over the Executive Branch, and it remains the 
statutory basis for a great deal of contemporary oversight activ-
ity.”18 It reorganized the unwieldy congressional committee sys-
tem, reducing the number of committees from forty-eight to 
nineteen in the House and from thirty-three to fifteen in the 
Senate.19 In addition, it defined committee jurisdictions in clear 
and systematic ways that allowed legislators to specialize in the 
oversight of specific elements of the executive.20 Congressional su-
pervision of the administrative state of the kind familiar today 
would simply not exist without the LRA. The leading historical ac-
counts of the LRA’s legislative passage emphasize that Congress 
intended to bolster its institutional capacity to act.21 More gener-
ally, Professor Eric Schickler’s study of every major institutional 
design change within Congress over the past century found 
“several major reforms,” including the LRA, were motivated in 
important part by “Congress-centered interests” that were dis-
tinct and different from partisan or personal careerist interests 
alone.22 
The official action at stake in each of these three contexts was 
not only materially significant, but also hard to explain in purely 
partisan or ideological terms. Rather, in each case, a pivotal deci-
sionmaker made a costly investment that advanced institutional 
 
 16 Jack Goldsmith, Lawyerly Integrity in the Trump Administration (Lawfare, May 
14, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/H2NS-KDXX. 
 17 60 Stat 812. 
 18 Jonathan G. Pray, Congressional Reporting Requirements: Testing the Limits of 
the Oversight Power, 76 U Colo L Rev 297, 305 (2005). 
 19 Roger H. Davidson, The Advent of the Modern Congress: The Legislative Reorgan-
ization Act of 1946, 15 Legis Stud Q 357, 365 (1990). 
 20 Id. 
 21 See id at 360. See also Karla W. Simon, Congress and Taxes: A Separation of Pow-
ers Analysis, 45 U Miami L Rev 1005, 1027 n 81 (1991) (“The Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1946 formalized the oversight function of Congress.”). 
 22 Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Develop-
ment of the U.S. Congress 8, 14 (Princeton 2001). 
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interests in a way that was likely at odds with (or at least orthog-
onal to) the optimal pursuit of partisan or ideological goals.23 
These actions are at least suggestive evidence of the continuing 
salience of institutional loyalty across the federal government 
(although it is quite telling that to find a legislative example, we 
are forced to retreat some seventy years back in time). They do 
not imply that institutional loyalty matters always, or even a 
majority of the time. Rather, the examples suggest that on some 
key policy questions, institutional loyalties can influence the 
shape and nature of federal action. 
With this descriptive claim in hand, our second, analytic con-
tribution is to define with precision the potential mechanisms 
through which “institutional loyalty” can operate. This analytic 
project has several elements. To begin with, we define “institu-
tional loyalty” to mean an individual official actor’s psychological 
proclivity to perceive his or her proper course of behavior in terms 
of, or as incorporating, what he or she perceives to be the best in-
terests of his or her home institution, and to behave in accordance 
with the interests of his or her home institution. This includes not 
only loyalty to advance a branch’s interest in the separation-of-
powers context, but also positive loyalty toward agency- and 
department-level interests. We then suggest that the Constitution 
contains several mechanisms with the potential to generate insti-
tutional loyalty at the branch level. To establish a more complete 
accounting of relevant mechanisms, we identify further examples 
from the agency and legislative design contexts. These examples, 
we readily concede, involve loyalties to a subbranch level—but 
they are helpful to our analytic project nonetheless. The ensuing 
taxonomy illuminates untapped options for recalibrating institu-
tional loyalties, and thereby enabling institutional retrenchment 
against potentially destabilizing partisan and ideological forces. 
We hence conclude that the modern position is right to posit that 
institutional loyalty does not emerge naturally or inevitably. We 
resist, however, the unspoken (if fairly plain) implication of the 
 
 23 There are other examples in which institutional interests and partisan motives 
clearly align. Consider, for example, the Senate’s refusal to hold hearings on Obama’s 
Supreme Court nominee, Judge Merrick Garland. Carl Hulse, Supreme Court Showdown 
Could Shape Fall Elections (NY Times, Mar 16, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/03/17/us/politics/supreme-court-nomination-obama-congress.html (visited Oct 19, 
2017) (Perma archive unavailable). We largely discard these examples because they do not 
provide unambiguous evidence of institutional loyalty at work. 
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modern position that our constitutional system is bereft of mech-
anisms to induce and reinforce such loyalties.24 
To demonstrate the potential for institutional redesign, we 
explore two distinct mechanisms that constitutional designers 
can use to elicit, or tamp down on, institutional loyalties. First, 
constitutional designers can manipulate the selection of officials 
who populate branches in ways that render them more or less 
likely to be institutionally minded. There are two relevant design 
decisions with such “selection effects.”25 These are rules that gov-
ern entrance to a branch and rules concerning exit. Scholars have 
previously explored selection rules’ use to promote a range of 
other constitutional goals, such as democratic accountability, 
transparency, and the minimization of democratic agency costs.26 
But their underappreciated effect on institutional loyalty, we sub-
mit, rewards renewed attention. 
Our second design margin hones in on the effect of organiza-
tional socialization on officials’ proclivity to align themselves with 
an institutional mission.27 The three branches of the federal gov-
ernment are bordered by a “thick political surround” of internal 
and external entities and interest groups.28 Against that back-
drop, constitutional designers can advance or limit branch-level 
incentives by fostering an institutional mandate that ousts 
 
 24 See Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2318 (cited in note 7) (“Madison’s will-
based theory of separation of powers would seem to require government officials who care 
more about the intrinsic interests of their departments than their personal interests or 
the interests of the citizens they represent. Democratic politics is unlikely to generate such 
officials.”). 
 25 Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 Va L Rev 953, 953 
(2005) (using the term and noting that such effects flow from “the question of which 
(potential) officials are selected to occupy those posts over time”). 
 26 Constitutions are typically shaped by a range of goals, including the creation of 
channels for peaceful political contestation, the enabling of public-good creation, the fos-
tering of legitimacy (democratic or otherwise), and the minimizing of agency costs. See 
Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq, Assessing Constitutional Performance, in Tom Ginsburg 
and Aziz Z. Huq, eds, Assessing Constitutional Performance 3, 14–23 (Cambridge 2016) 
(setting out four criteria for the evaluation of a constitution’s success: legitimacy, channel-
ing political conflict, limiting agency costs, and creating public goods). The same sort of 
ends-related pluralism characterizes the separation of powers. See Aziz Z. Huq and Jon 
D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 Yale L J 346, 382–
91 (2016). 
 27 See Daniel Carpenter and George A. Krause, Transactional Authority and Bureau-
cratic Politics, 25 J Pub Admin Rsrch & Theory 5, 13 (2014) (discussing the relationship 
between organizational socialization and institutional loyalty). See also John Brehm and 
Scott Gates, Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic 
Public 3 (Michigan 1999) (summarizing historical research that shows the influence of “a 
bureaucrat’s own preferences, peers, supervisors, and clients” on work decisions). 
 28 Huq and Michaels, 126 Yale L J at 391 (cited in note 26). 
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attachments to competing elements of the thick political sur-
round, and thereby provides a crisper focal point for institutional 
loyalty. We explore the ways in which a constitutional designer 
(or a legislator) can “slice up” institutions of government in order 
to induce beliefs in a mandate. Alternatively, designers can har-
ness, or even create, social networks to strengthen or undermine 
institutional loyalty. These networks, which emerge within and 
also cut across branches, are often ignored because of their infor-
mal, unstructured operation. But they too importantly promote 
(or undermine) ideological and partisan interests that compete 
with institutional loyalty. 
Finally, in addition to these descriptive and analytic points, 
we aim to make a distinct normative contribution. We argue that 
constitutional designers usefully take account of institutional loy-
alty as part of their efforts to craft a desirable separation of 
powers. In our view, institutional loyalties are not in and of them-
selves intrinsically desirable ends. Rather, they play a founda-
tional role in sometimes helping, and sometimes hindering, the 
realization of otherwise normatively desirable constitutional 
ends.  
Nevertheless, because institutional loyalties can play a piv-
otal role in shaping how structural constitutional law operates at 
times, the situations in which these loyalties promote desirable 
constitutional goals ought to be considered and embraced. In con-
trast, when loyalties undermine those goals, they should be 
avoided. So the task of the institutional designer is complex: it is 
to calibrate the appropriate mix of such loyalties across the 
branches by estimating when they will advance needful constitu-
tional ends, and when they will retard them. Of necessity, this 
task requires some estimation and informed prediction. It is not 
one that can be executed with mathematical precision given the 
vagaries of national political life. But this does not distinguish it 
from most other elements of constitutional and institutional 
design, which must be accomplished in the teeth of substantial 
uncertainty about the future. 
Our reckoning of institutional loyalties, in sum, is more 
nuanced than Madison’s. Consistent with this subtler approach, 
we aim here to identify conditions under which institutional 
loyalty might motivate constitutional compliance, counteract 
disabling partisan polarization, and dampen the agency costs of 
representative democracy. We think that institutional loyalty 
should be cultivated to these ends. On the other hand, we flag 
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instances in which such loyalty undermines the rule of law, 
thwarts the vindication of constitutional rights, and destabilizes 
the deliberative, polyarchic29 form of governance sought by the 
Framers. Not surprisingly, we think institutional loyalty in the 
latter cases should be titrated with greater caution. 
In terms of specific reforms, our suggestions are branch spe-
cific. We think that useful institutional reform efforts focus now 
on increasing institutional loyalty within the legislature while 
diminishing it within the judiciary. The executive branch 
presents a subtler question. In some contexts, the executive is 
powerfully motivated by institutional loyalty in ways that re-
dound to the public good. This may be especially so when elected 
actors press agendas that are directly disruptive of longstanding 
democratic or institutional practice. But in other regards, there is 
a case for diluting their effects in ways that protect the rule of law 
from potentially corrupting and distorting influences. 
Our focus on these interbranch relations means we must 
sideline the related but distinct question of federalism as a 
cockpit in which institutional loyalty also plays a potentially 
salient function. The question whether state officials advance the 
institutional interests of states when lobbying Congress,30 partic-
ipating in cooperative federalism programs,31 contributing to 
administrative agency rulemaking,32 or advancing structural con-
stitutional arguments in the Supreme Court33 is an important and 
 
 29 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition 8 (Yale 1971) 
(“[P]olyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that 
is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation.”). 
 30 See Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 
66 Stan L Rev 217, 280–88 (2014) (analyzing difficulties states’ officials have in advancing 
state interests in Congress, and suggesting generalizations about when that might occur). 
 31 Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 BC L Rev 1, 31 (2011) (“State and federal 
actors also negotiate over enforcement policy and individual enforcement actions arising 
within cooperative federalism programs.”). 
 32 See Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 
Va L Rev 953, 961, 970 (2014) (arguing that “state interest groups’ advocacy efforts were 
initiated to create a voice for states qua states—a voice for the institutional interests of 
state governments rather than the varied political preferences of state constituents or in-
dividual state officials”—and noting that “[t]o the extent federal law has directed agencies 
to engage states in federal decision making, it has done so largely by giving state interest 
groups a central role”). 
 33 See, for example, Reply Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, Florida, South 
Carolina, Nebraska, Texas, Utah, Louisiana, Alabama, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Washington, 
Idaho, South Dakota, Indiana, North Dakota, Mississippi, Arizona, Nevada, Georgia, 
Alaska, Ohio, Kansas, Wyoming, Wisconsin, and Maine; Schuette; Branstad v United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, Docket No 11-400, *11 (US filed Mar 
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fascinating one. We hope our analysis shows the utility of an 
institutional loyalty–focused framing. Perhaps this lens is espe-
cially useful at a time when not merely individual fidelities to 
institutions, but even the stable and predictable operation of 
national institutions themselves, appear to be subject to pressure 
of sorts from populist political movements on all sides seeking to 
disrupt the institutional status quo.34 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the conceptual 
groundwork by defining and historicizing the concept of institu-
tional loyalty. We demonstrate the past and present importance 
of institutional loyalty as both a complement to and substitute for 
other mechanisms to safeguard the separation of powers. Part II 
then introduces a typology of four mechanisms whereby institu-
tional loyalty can be cultivated. For each pathway, we carefully 
examine necessary assumptions and prerequisites. In Part III, 
working across all three branches, we consider the extent to 
which institutional loyalty can be identified at work in each of the 
three branches. We further adduce suggested reforms for 
strengthening or rechanneling institutional loyalty based on the 
insights gained through Part II’s typology. 
I.  INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTIES (AND THEIR CRITICS) 
We begin our analysis by clarifying the idea of institutional 
loyalty. We first offer a definition of the concept. We then trace its 
historical and contemporary importance to constitutional law. 
While the idea has deep roots and foundational importance to 
constitutional law, prevailing legal scholarship is largely hostile 
to the concept. We then develop a range of motivating examples 
to demonstrate the continued prevalence of institutional loyalty. 
A. Defining Institutional Loyalties 
An institutional loyalty is an individual official actor’s psy-
chological proclivity to perceive his or her proper course of behav-
ior in terms of, or as incorporating, what he or she perceives to be 
the best interests of his or her home institution, and to behave in 
 
12, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 864598) (challenging the Affordable Care Act’s 
requirement that states expand their Medicaid programs as unconstitutionally coercive). 
 34 For more extended consideration of the interaction of populism with constitutional 
democracy in the US context, see Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional 
Democracy, 65 UCLA L Rev *19 (forthcoming 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/XB4S 
-8ZAH; Aziz Z. Huq, Book Review, The People against the Constitution, 116 Mich L Rev *5 
(forthcoming 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/V5EQ-9ZMP. 
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accordance with the interests of his or her home institution. To 
have an institutional loyalty is thus to maintain a stable concep-
tion of how best an institution’s mandate—the core purposes or 
functions it aims to achieve—can be promoted and to act in ac-
cordance with that conception. Competing loyalties and interests 
arise, of course, but loyalty to the institution helps ensure that 
behavior consistent with the interests of the institution persists 
in the face of this competition. 
While the idea of an institutional loyalty has fallen out of cur-
rent constitutional jurisprudence, it is a familiar one from our 
daily lives. Most of us belong to a team, a religious or civic insti-
tution, or an organized association (or even a law school). We 
necessarily decide when and whether to align our individual sen-
timents with the apparent needs of the institutions with which 
we affiliate. Within such institutional contexts, it is common to 
observe that some individuals identify and behave more consist-
ently with the institution’s shared interests, while others hew to 
a more narrowly defined, individual conception of self-interest. 
Given the pervasiveness and obvious salience of such loyalties in 
ordinary life, we think it is at least worth asking whether analogs 
exist in public law. 
Institutional loyalty is also familiar to scholars outside of con-
stitutional law. Within the rational-choice tradition, institutional 
allegiances are evaluated in terms of the costs and benefits to in-
dividuals of participation in a group. The central collective-action 
problem that interest groups face, most famously identified by 
Professor Mancur Olson, turns on the incentives that individuals 
face to act in their own interests and thereby free ride on and 
undermine their institution.35 Following Olsen, public-choice 
scholars have written extensively about the conditions in which 
institutional loyalties arise and overcome individual incentives to 
free ride.36 But in so doing, political scientists have departed 
somewhat from the standard motivational premises of rational-
choice theory. Some, in a tenor that is relevant to our project here, 
have contended that institutions are often constructed to have 
 
 35 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups 165–67 (Harvard 1971) (stating that large institutions face difficulties in convinc-
ing individual members to act in the collective institutional interest). 
 36 The empirical literature refuting or at least complicating Olson’s simplified claim 
is extensive. For a few of the best summaries of this literature, see Ernst Fehr and Simon 
Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J Econ Persp 159, 
162–63 (Summer 2000); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community 
Policing, 90 Cal L Rev 1513, 1516 (2002). 
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“purposes” and be “carriers of ideas,” such that their “norms and 
values affect their members” to act on behalf of their institutions.37 
An institutional loyalty rests, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
on a contestable judgment about how to conceptualize a branch’s 
best interests. The right way to be loyal, say to Congress or the 
executive, cannot be identified mechanically ex ante. Institu-
tional loyalists may therefore disagree about the precise demands 
imposed by their fidelity. That said, we think that institutional 
loyalty is often characterized by long time horizons. Given the 
durability of the branches, their interests are more likely to be 
understood in a longer rather than a shorter time frame. In 
contrast, the ideological and partisan loyalty identified by the 
modern position may evince a wider variety of time horizons, 
ranging from brief to long. 
Institutional loyalty might also exist in two subtly different 
forms, but both yield similar behavioral effects. First, an individ-
ual official can perceive an institution’s interests as her interests: 
there is no gap between individual sentiment and institutional 
loyalty. An institutional loyalty, in other words, can be sincere.38 
Alternatively, an individual official might disagree in whole or in 
part with the institution’s goals, but nonetheless decide to treat 
the institution’s interests as her own. She might do so for strategic 
reasons (for example, career advancement) or out of a sense of role 
morality.39 For the purposes of our analysis, we largely lump 
together sincere and strategic forms of allegiance. 
 
 37 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Develop-
ment 82–83 (Cambridge 2004). Our reading of the rational-choice tradition in legal 
scholarship is that there is a focus generally on individual costs and benefits, although 
sophisticated theorists are clear that they understand individuals to have other prefer-
ences and values. See, for example, Guido Calabresi, The Future of Law and Economics: 
Essays in Reform and Recollection 136–41 (Yale 2016) (describing this phenomenon and 
noting in particular that “economists have sometimes ignored the desire for altruism and 
beneficence that in fact many people have”). We aim here to take one subset of such goals 
and values seriously on their own terms. 
 38 See, for example, Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 Va L Rev 987, 992 
(2008) (defining sincerity in a similar context as “correspondence between what people 
say, what they intend to say, and what they believe”). 
 39 See Arthur Isak Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public 
and Professional Life 63 (Princeton 1999) (describing role morality as the “particular moral 
reasons for action that others, outside the [institutional] role, do not face”); W. Bradley 
Wendel, Book Review, Professional Roles and Moral Agency, 89 Georgetown L J 667, 673 
(2001) (discussing role morality in terms of “the power of roles to permit an agent to delib-
erate on the basis of a restricted set of reasons—leaving out, for example, considerations 
of harm to third parties”). 
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Institutional loyalty is not necessarily identical to what 
Professor Daryl Levinson has called “empire-building govern-
ment.”40 Consider again our threshold examples concerning Chief 
Justice Roberts and the executive-branch lawyers in OLC.41 In 
both, there is evidence that institutional loyalty was at work and 
that loyalty yielded careful thought about how best to advance an 
institution’s interests. Both Roberts and the executive-branch 
lawyers advanced an institutional agenda by trimming their 
home institution’s powers. To Roberts, it was (arguably) obvious 
that avoiding some divisive rulings would bolster the Article III 
judiciary’s reputation. To the executive-branch lawyers, it was ob-
vious that their home department would be strengthened in the 
long term by advancing more limited legal claims (and hence 
perhaps a means of credible commitment that would reduce 
congressional resistance to delegation and judicial skepticism of 
executive action).  
On both points, Roberts and the lawyers might have been 
wrong as a matter of fact: their chosen actions might have weak-
ened their respective branches in unforeseen ways. Or they might 
have been wrong as a normative matter: the “best” way for an 
institution—be it a branch, a business, a family, or a nation—to 
prosper is rarely beyond dispute. But the complexity and nuance 
of their judgments suggest that what we call institutional loyalty 
need not be “empire-building” in character.42 
B.  Historicizing Institutional Loyalties 
Institutional autonomy is an important goal of American 
constitutional design. Democratic control over institutions has 
long been an important mechanism to generate this autonomy. 
Democratic control, though, can often be insufficient to protect in-
stitutions. From the Framers’ vantage point, ensuring that those 
working for institutions are loyal to these institutions was an 
important complement to democratic control and a necessary 
foundation for institutional autonomy. 
The idea of institutional loyalty enters American constitu-
tional law in James Madison’s account of the separation of powers 
 
 40 Levinson, 118 Harv L Rev at 917 (cited in note 8) (defining “empire-building” as 
governmental behavior that seeks to maximize power and/or wealth “at the expense of 
competing government bodies—and, ultimately, at the expense of the citizenry”). 
 41 See text accompanying notes 11–16. 
 42 See Levinson, 118 Harv L Rev at 928 (cited in note 8). 
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in Federalist 51.43 The question of what would preserve institu-
tional boundaries between the three branches was pressed 
actively in the constitutional ratification debates. Antifederalist 
critics of the 1787 Constitution were alarmed by what they per-
ceived as deficiencies in the Constitution’s separations between 
powers.44 Many, such as the pseudonymous Pennsylvania Officer 
in the Late Continental Army, worried that the 1787 proposal had 
simply “not kept separate” different governmental powers.45 A 
related concern was that institutional barriers would not prove 
stable. The Philadelphia-based Antifederalist Centinel, for exam-
ple, doubted the viability of “three balancing powers [that is, 
branches], whose repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium 
of interests.”46 
The most celebrated response to these arguments is found in 
a series of essays, beginning with Federalist 47, in which Madison, 
writing pseudonymously as Publius, defended the proposed 
“constitutional equilibrium” between the three branches.47 Madison 
argued that “dependence on the people” would be the “primary 
controul on the government.”48 Madison turned to Thomas 
Jefferson’s proposal of popular enforcement of separation-of-powers 
constraints via periodic constitutional conventions tasked with 
resolving interbranch contentions.49 
But such popular control, Madison explained, would be inad-
equate for several reasons. To begin with, frequent conventions 
would imply “defect[s]” in government, sapping the “veneration, 
 
 43 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3). 
 44 See Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 54 (Chicago 1981). 
 45 Id at 60 (quoting an Antifederalist tract by the “Officer of the Late Continental 
Army”). See also Cecilia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature 
of Representative Government, 12 Wm & Mary Q 3, 23 (1955) (describing the Antifederalists’ 
demand for a “more rigid” separation of powers). 
 46 Centinel, To the Freemen of Pennsylvania, in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 2 The Com-
plete Anti-Federalist, 136, 138 (Chicago 1981). See also Kenyon, 12 Wm & Mary Q at 23 
(cited in note 45) (discussing Antifederalist demand for “more effective checks and 
balances”). 
 47 Federalist 49 at 341 (cited in note 5). Because our analysis is an effort to clarify 
the argument offered by Madison, we do not offer any larger claim about belief in institu-
tional loyalty among the Founding generation. 
 48 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3). 
 49 Federalist 49 at 338–39 (cited in note 5) (quotation marks omitted): 
One of the precautions . . . as a palladium to the weaker departments of power, 
against the invasions of the stronger, is . . . that whenever any two of the three 
branches of government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices of two thirds 
of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the constitu-
tion, or correcting breaches of it, a convention shall be called for the purpose. 
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which time bestows on every thing.”50 Madison also worried that 
partisan “passions” would cloud popular judgment about the 
importance of institutional boundaries.51 Even when popular 
judgment recognized these boundaries’ value, the people might be 
handicapped because they lacked information about what their 
agents were doing.52 To be sure, Madison thought that the gov-
ernment’s relationship with the people “ought to be marked out, 
and kept open,”53 but he also knew that the aspiration toward 
transparency would on occasion be thwarted.54 
These concerns were grave enough, Madison thought, to 
make a “necessity of auxiliary precautions.”55 If “better motives”56 
protecting institutional boundaries would not always be found 
among the people, they could be supplied via the mechanism of 
institutional loyalty. Federalist 51 introduces the concept in a 
famous passage: 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest 
of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights 
of the place. . . . This policy of supplying by opposite and rival 
interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced 
through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as 
public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate 
distributions of power; where the constant aim is to divide 
and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each 
may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every 
individual, may be a centinel over the public rights.57 
Madison’s argument has several elements, which can be 
usefully disaggregated: (1) the alignment between officials’ and 
offices’ interests (which we label institutional loyalty) (2) that will 
be “opposite and rival” to each other (3) so as to shield public 
rights and stabilize a “constitutional equilibrium.” We are inter-
ested here in the first element. This element, we note, is concep-
tually distinct from the other pieces of Madison’s argument. 
 
 50 Id at 340. 
 51 Id at 342–43. 
 52 For a helpful discussion of this problem of institutional clarity in constitutional 
design, see G. Bingham Powell Jr, Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian 
and Proportional Visions 61–64 (Yale 2000). 
 53 Federalist 49 at 339 (cited in note 5). 
 54 Id at 339–40 (noting that the direct appeal to the people would not always be a 
means of resolving conflict). 
 55 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
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In Madison’s account, institutional loyalty plays the part that 
“self-love” has in Adam Smith’s famous economic theory, a private 
vice that can be set in dynamic interaction against itself to 
promote the public good.58 Institutional loyalties lead officials to 
“resist encroachments of the other[ ]” branches.59 Official loyalty 
to one’s institution means that their resistance does not fluctuate 
along with popular “passions.”60 In this sense, institutional loy-
alty complements democratic control as a mechanism to protect 
branch-level boundaries, especially at moments when passions 
sweep the populace. 
Madison limns three paths by which this mechanism has an 
effect. First, institutions can operate as “a check on [each] other.”61 
If the executive branch is generating “encroachments” on Congress, 
for example, officials loyal to the legislative branch expend time 
and effort to “resist” the executive.62 Second, Madison also 
thought a third party (such as a federal court, or perhaps the 
several states) might identify and “resist encroachments.”63 The 
legislative branch can resist the executive branch by initiating or 
organizing challenges to the executive branch in federal court, for 
instance. Third, those within an institution have a comparative 
advantage in identifying and resisting encroachments on their 
authority.64 
 
 58 See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
16 (Chicago 1976) (Edwin Cannan, ed) (originally published 1776): 
But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in 
vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to 
prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is 
for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. 
For Madison’s reading of Smith, see Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith’s Reception among 
the American Founders, 1776–1790, 59 Wm & Mary Q 897, 905–15 (2002); David Prindle, 
The Invisible Hand of James Madison, 15 Const Polit Economy 223, 231–34 (2004). 
 59 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3). 
 60 Federalist 49 at 343 (cited in note 5) (“The passions ought to be controuled and 
regulated by the government.”). 
 61 Federalist 51 at 349 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id at 349, 351. 
 64 Id at 349. As an aside, we think Madison missed a complication here: if officials 
change course only when another institution resists, their reliance on others’ policing 
efforts might crowd out any internalization of the Constitution’s structural norms. See 
Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 Econ J 1043, 
1044–45 (1997). See also Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U 
Chi L Rev 421, 424 (2003) (“[T]he self-interest assumption may crowd out public-spirited 
motivations.”). The possibility of a feedback effect of this sort suggests a need to consider 
how the design of interbranch interactions dynamically influences the incentives and 
beliefs of those within the branches. 
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Writing as Publius, Madison and Alexander Hamilton both 
expressed their expectation that institutional loyalties would gen-
erate good government. Addressing the Senate’s willingness to 
punish executive-branch wrongdoing through the impeachment 
process, Hamilton in Federalist 66 hence avers to that chamber’s 
“pride, if not . . . [its] virtue,” as a spring of action.65 And, discuss-
ing relations between the national government and the several 
states, Madison hypothesized “motives on the part of the State 
governments, to augment their prerogatives,” and conjectured 
that even officials elected to federal office would have “preposses-
sions . . . generally . . . favorable to the States.”66 These pro-
institutional inclinations, he suggested, would be so strong that 
even if the national government had “an equal disposition with 
the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits,” 
the latter were likely to “have the advantage.”67 
There is also a trace of an institutional loyalty–based argument 
in Hamilton’s defense of the federal judiciary in Federalist 78.68 On 
Hamilton’s account, members of the federal judiciary would be 
steeped in a dense network of “strict rules and precedents,” which 
require hard study to master.69 Judges’ behavior, Hamilton argued, 
would be oriented and shaped by organizational socialization on 
the branch. By analogy to then-contemporary models of human 
psychology, Hamilton seems to have supposed that the legalistic 
loyalty inculcated in Article III judges would orient the federal 
bench toward acting as the “conscience” of the federal govern-
ment.70 It requires only a small step to hypothesize on this basis 
that judges’ guild loyalty will lead them to value and protect their 
branch’s distinctive institutional culture and role. 
In developing this Madisonian vision, we think it is 
important to observe that institutional loyalty, while a crucial 
design dimension of constitutional law, is also a normatively com-
plicated one. Institutional loyalty is not identical to constitutional 
loyalty. An institution’s best interests can be served by behaviors 
not contemplated or allowed by constitutional law. Moreover, the 
boundaries of an institution are already sufficiently robust that 
 
 65 Federalist 66 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 445, 451 (cited in note 3). 
 66 Federalist 46 (Madison), in The Federalist, 315, 317–19 (cited in note 3). 
 67 Id at 319. 
 68 See Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521, 526–30 (cited in note 3). 
 69 Id at 529. 
 70 Daniel W. Howe, The Political Psychology of The Federalist, 44 Wm & Mary Q 485, 
500 (1987). 
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officials’ zeal and loyalty can disserve the stability of the consti-
tutional system. 
But this gap between institutional and constitutional loyalty 
is left largely unaddressed by Madison and his contemporaries. 
The Federalist Papers separately address institutional loyalty (in 
places like Federalist 51) and constitutional loyalty. Hamilton, 
for instance, defended the Electoral College in Federalist 68 as a 
means of ensuring loyalty to constitutional principle given its ten-
dency to select for “characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue,” 
and not only those with a talent for “the little arts of popularity.”71 
He did not connect this theory (however sound it might be in prac-
tice) to his accounts of institutional loyalties, or to the Madisonian 
vision of ambition checking ambition. Nor does Publius ever 
explain why a national representative process that generates 
officials inclined to pursue “the common good of the society”72 
would also throw up institutionally disposed officials. In short, 
even when reconstructed with a friendly eye, the Madisonian 
account of institutional loyalties is characterized by gaps and dis-
continuities with the balance of Publius’s theory of constitutional 
design. 
This institutional loyalty understanding of official motivation 
has not fallen completely out of the jurisprudence. In construing 
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act73 in National Labor Relations 
Board v SW General, Inc,74 for example, Roberts explained 
Congress’s decision to alter that statutory scheme in 1998 as 
motivated by a “[p]erceiv[ed] threat to the Senate’s advice and 
consent power.”75 At least in the Court’s view, therefore, it is still 
sensible to gloss congressional action in terms of the durable 
institutional prerogatives and powers of Article I institutions. In 
a similar vein, the District of Columbia courts have recognized 
that when Congress as “[an] institution [ ] files suit, it can obtain 
a remedy for the ‘institutional’ injury.”76 The recognition for 
 
 71 Federalist 68 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 457, 460–61 (cited in note 3). 
 72 Federalist 57 (Madison), in The Federalist 384, 384 (cited in note 3). 
 73 Pub L No 105-277, 112 Stat 2681 (1998), codified at 5 USC § 3345 et seq. 
 74 137 S Ct 929 (2017). 
 75 Id at 936. 
 76 United States House of Representatives v Burwell, 130 F Supp 3d 53, 72 (DDC 
2015) (authorizing suit by the House to challenge violations of the Appropriations Clause), 
quoting Kucinich v Bush, 236 F Supp 2d 1, 7 (DDC 2002). The Supreme Court has recog-
nized an analog institutional interest in state legislatures. See Arizona State Legislature 
v Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S Ct 2652, 2664 (2015) (authorizing 
a challenge under Article I to an independent redistricting commission on the ground that 
“[t]he Arizona Legislature . . . is an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury”). 
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Article III standing purposes of a legislature’s ability to vindicate 
“institutional” interests by seeking injunctive or declaratory relief 
is a formal legal recognition of the idea that the officials within 
one of the three branches can and do act on the basis of institu-
tional, rather than ideological or partisan, grounds.77 
C. Questioning Institutional Loyalties 
Current legal scholarship tells a different story about insti-
tutional loyalties. Leading voices in law reviews appear to be 
skeptical that institutional loyalties even exist and are skeptical 
of the notion that they might be sufficiently reliable and regular 
to explain institutional behavior.78 In consequence, such motiva-
tions do not play a large role in current constitutional scholarship 
on the separation of powers. To be clear, few scholars reject the 
bare possibility of an institutional loyalty. It is rather that the 
latter concept plays a relatively marginal role in their accounts. 
This is complemented by an embrace of an alternative strain of 
fidelities—partisan and ideological, in the main—that are cast as 
more acutely motivating than institutional loyalty. Behavior 
might be consistent with institutional loyalty, on this view, but is 
never caused by it. We term this skeptical approach the “modern 
position” on institutional loyalty. We set forth this skeptical story 
in general terms, and then consider its roots. This serves as a 
prelude to Parts II and III, and it suggests that institutional 
loyalty not only exists but can be analyzed in parsimonious and 
rigorous terms as part of constitutional law. To be clear, while we 
admire much of the scholarship that the modern position com-
prises, and find much to praise in it, we think its most ambitious 
variants sweep too far. We offer a modest course correction here—
a measure of supplemental theorizing of a term that can otherwise 
easily drop out of institutional analysis. 
 
 77 Of course, the actual decision to initiate a lawsuit may be better explained on 
partisan grounds. See text accompanying notes 145–46. 
 78 Part of the reaction of modern scholars to institutional loyalty is to question 
whether there has ever been a clearly articulated theoretical account of the mechanisms—
if any—that lead to institutional loyalty. See, for example, Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv 
L Rev at 2317 (cited in note 7) (“[I]t has never been clear exactly how the Madisonian 
machine [of competitive branches] was supposed to operate.”); M. Elizabeth Magill, The 
Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va L Rev 1127, 1158 (2000) (“Just how 
tension and competition [between the branches] are created and maintained is never 
clearly spelled out by courts or commentators.”). The modern position has been to criticize 
the absence of mechanisms for institutional loyalty just as much as the accuracy of any 
mechanisms that could be offered. 
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The modern position is based on three interrelated descrip-
tive claims about other affiliations that crowd out institutional 
loyalties. First, some scholars argue that partisan loyalties 
dominate and lead officials to act inconsistently with institutional 
interests.79 Officials rely on parties to win elections for Congress 
or the White House and to secure political appointments to the 
executive branch and the federal bench; they subsequently main-
tain their fealty to their partisan patrons.80 Officials also rely on 
parties to exercise significant powers while in office and pursue 
partisan agendas when interacting with other governmental bod-
ies.81 As a result of these observed regularities, “realist claims 
about legal indeterminancy [sic] and the relation of law and poli-
tics are widely accepted in the academy.”82 To those who subscribe 
to the overwhelming power of partisan loyalty, it is a historical 
irony that Madison and his contemporaries (many of whom would 
go on to create national parties) did not realize that political par-
ties would exist and would generate such powerful incentives that 
can in practice counteract institutional loyalty.83 
Second, other scholars contend that ideological allegiances 
conflict with and overwhelm institutional loyalties. An official’s 
underlying sentiment about policy motivates their behavior, even 
 
 79 See, for example, Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2323 (cited in note 7) 
(“[E]lectoral and policy interests of politicians have become intimately connected to polit-
ical parties.”). See also Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 Va L Rev 301, 330–31 
(2010) (“Individuals have party loyalties and personal interests, however, which may sys-
tematically diverge from institutional interests.”). 
 80 See, for example, Neal Devins and David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: 
Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 BU L Rev 459, 490 (2008) 
(noting that cross-party commission appointees are loyal to their party, not the president 
who appointed them). 
 81 See, for example, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 
102 Va L Rev 953, 975 (2016) (“The partisan genealogy of executive federalism . . . is strik-
ing . . . . [The] national party system generates ties among state and federal actors.”). See 
also generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv L Rev 1077 (2014) 
(exploring how partisanship has transformed federalism and interactions between govern-
ments). For other scholarship that discusses the dynamic between partisan and institu-
tional motives, see, for example, Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional 
Showdowns, 156 U Pa L Rev 991, 1036 (2008); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 
37 John Marshall L Rev 523, 529–30 (2004). 
 82 Alice Ristroph, Is Law? Constitutional Crisis and Existential Anxiety, 25 Const 
Commen 431, 434 (2009). 
 83 See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, 
Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy 16–26 (Harvard 2005); Bruce Ackerman 
and David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 90 Va L Rev 
551, 557–67 (2004). 
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when in conflict with institutional interests.84 This assumption 
dominates political science models of judicial behavior.85 It is 
commonplace in that literature to assert that “the Supreme Court 
decides disputes in light of . . . the ideological attitudes and values 
of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist vote[d] the way he [did] 
because he [was] extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way 
he did because he [was] extremely liberal.”86 While measures of 
ideology have become more nuanced of late, many hew to the be-
lief that the ideological loyalties of the justices motivate decisions, 
not their loyalty toward the Court qua institution. Building on 
this attitudinal model, positive political theorists have observed 
that even ideologically motivated judges must account for the 
likely strategic responses to their interventions and tailor their 
actions accordingly.87 While such models yield more nuanced 
predictions, they are characterized by the same a priori margin-
alization of institutional loyalty.88 
Ideological loyalty is correlated with, but not identical to, par-
tisan loyalty. Being motivated by a belief about what furthers a 
policy goal is different from being motivated by a belief about 
what serves a political organization. But presidents of one party 
sometimes, either on purpose89 or as an unintentional side effect 
 
 84 The precise form of ideology generating the ideological loyalty can be disputed. 
The various forms of ideological loyalty all return to some comprehensive worldview re-
garding the proper behavior of government motivating official behaviors. See David Fontana 
and Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence from a National 
Experiment, 112 Colum L Rev 731, 749–51 (2012). 
 85 See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U Chi L 
Rev 831, 836 & n 22 (2008) (“To date, the question that has received the most attention 
from the New Legal Realists is the influence of a judge’s political ideology or attitudes.”). 
 86 Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal 
Model 65 (Cambridge 1993). This is the classic statement of attitudinalism, one that has 
been modified and expanded over the past generation. An exception to this view is Judge 
Richard Posner’s influential 1993 article, which emphasizes leisure and income but not 
ideological “power trip[s].” Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? 
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of another goal, nominate an official with a differing ideological 
perspective, in some instances “using the agent’s known enmity 
to the principal’s benefit.”90 For example, presidents might nomi-
nate judges with different ideological preferences from their own 
as a way of credibly signaling the judges’ competence, or alterna-
tively in order to impose costs on the partisan opposition. 
President Obama’s 2016 nomination of the eminent moderate 
jurist Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court, we think, has this 
flavor. At other instances, partisan affiliation may simply be a 
bad proxy for ideological preferences. Famously, President 
Dwight Eisenhower nominated both Justice William Brennan (a 
Democrat) and Chief Justice Earl Warren (a Republican) to the 
Supreme Court.91 He later expressed regret about both because of 
their liberal tilt.92 All that said, we note that the two major polit-
ical parties have become increasingly ideologically homogeneous 
and polarized as party and ideology have become more strongly 
correlated.93 
In addition, it is worth noting that it is quite possible for a 
partisan or an ideological loyalty to bleed into an institutional 
loyalty. An ideological commitment to certain policy goals may 
conduce to a belief in the primacy of one particular branch; for 
instance, a strong concern with national security might conduce 
to a preference for executive-branch primacy.94 In such instances, 
the line between ideological and institutional loyalties may be 
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blurred. But the existence of ambiguous cases at the margin does 
not rob these categories of their utility as a general matter. 
Third, the modern position argues that personal, materialis-
tic loyalties conflict with and overwhelm institutional loyalties.95 
A loyalty to maximize power (in current office or by seeking a 
higher one) could conflict with institutional loyalty. A desire for 
the immediate or longitudinal acquisition of wealth could also 
conflict with institutional loyalty. The federal criminal offense of 
honest services fraud, which penalizes naked self-dealing in the 
performance of “official act[s],”96 is one mechanism for mitigating 
such conflicts. The recent Supreme Court decision in McDonnell 
v United States97 narrowly construed that prohibition, effectively 
allowing personal pecuniary interests greater leeway to displace 
both ideological and institutional concerns.98 
The modern position supplements these arguments by insist-
ing on the impossibility of defining institutional powers. Madison 
might have been a theorist of institutional loyalty, but he 
famously wrote that “no skill in the science of government has yet 
been able to . . . define, with sufficient certainty, [government’s] 
three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary.”99 
Legal scholars have likewise argued that defining what it would 
mean to protect “Congress” is a difficult enterprise.100 Absent a 
cogent account of institutional perimeters, it is assumed, there is 
no way to maintain a loyalty toward an institution. 
Legal scholars articulating the modern position hence con-
struct an account of governmental behavior in which there is 
scant space for institutional loyalty. When a president disagrees 
with large numbers of his partisan or ideological allies in the 
Congress, scholars are not only reluctant to ascribe this to a 
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favorable loyalty toward the executive branch but instead offer 
the alternative explanation that it could “reflect[ ] the divergent 
preferences of the different temporal and geographical majorities 
that the House, Senate, and President represent (as opposed to 
the institutional interests of the branches as such).”101 Scholars 
writing about the persistence and predictability of institutional 
loyalties are therefore left playing defense, having to discount 
possible alternative loyalties that could explain a behavior that 
appears to be based on an institutional loyalty. 
Official claims on behalf of institutional interests may also be 
discounted as a form of “cheap talk.” The modern position is that 
such claims are ex post rationalizations, not ex ante loyalty. Pub-
licly asserting an alternative loyalty—instead of an institutional 
one—would be politically disastrous.102 For example, consider the 
congressional reaction to the equally divided Supreme Court’s 
affirmance of the Fifth Circuit’s decision that had earlier invali-
dated Obama’s immigration deferred-action programs,103 which 
included Republican Speaker Paul Ryan issuing a widely noted 
statement proclaiming his institutional loyalty. Ryan said that he 
supported the lawsuit to ensure that “Article I of the Constitution 
was vindicated” and that this success was a “major victory in our 
fight to restore the separation of powers.”104 The modern position 
is that Ryan talked a good institutional game but had a distinct 
and different underlying loyalty. As one of the major national 
leaders of the Republican Party, his partisan loyalty led him to 
challenge the actions of a president of the other party. As an 
ideologically conservative elected official, he did not believe in 
creating a legal status for undocumented immigrants. As an 
ambitious young politician, placing himself in front of a major na-
tional issue promised more power and prominence. Taking Ryan 
as a model actor in the constitutional system, it is a short step to 
a general rejection of the possibility of an institutional loyalty. 
In short, the modern view of the motivations of institutional 
actors within our separation of powers leaves little space for 
institutional loyalties, even if it does not reject as a categorical 
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matter the possibility of such fidelities. It is this lacuna in the 
literature that we aim to explore here. 
D. Identifying Institutional Loyalties 
Institutional loyalty can be observed among contemporary 
officials in all three branches. Although we can identify instances 
of institutional loyalty in quite disparate circumstances, we make 
no claim here about their relative frequency in comparison to 
other motivations (for example, partisan, ideological, and so on). 
More modestly, we think institutional loyalty is not a marginal 
phenomenon. It has played meaningful roles in many important 
constitutional-law disputes. We offer a range of illustrations 
drawn from each of the three branches, extending our discussion 
in the Introduction.105 We err on the side of numerosity given that 
the idea of institutional loyalty is broad—for reasons explored at 
the end of this Part. 
1. The executive branch. 
We begin by offering instances of institutional loyalty at work 
within the executive. We start with high-profile post-9/11 claims 
of executive authority in the Bush administration. We then turn 
to equally controversial debates about executive authority in the 
foreign policy area during the Obama administration. 
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the Bush White 
House articulated a “concede[dly] . . . aggressive” view of executive 
authority that would have preempted or narrowed congressional 
directives on military deployment, detention, torture, and elec-
tronic surveillance.106 Other policy paths of less resistance existed 
but were rejected because of a loyalty to a particular constitu-
tional role for the executive. Many (but not all) of the policies 
pursued under this Article II flag could have been supported by 
“creative[,] . . . perhaps even tendentious,” interpretations of fed-
eral statutes.107 Republicans controlled the House until 2007, and 
 
 105 See text accompanying notes 11–22. 
 106 David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
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the Senate after 2002, and likely would have supported new stat-
utes authorizing much of what the Bush administration argued 
that Article II granted it the power to do.108 
But members of the Bush administration, and in particular 
Vice President Richard Cheney, offered a different account. On 
their view, decisions were motivated by a personal commitment 
to establishing an expansive constitutional role of the executive, 
which in their view had been unduly cabined since the 1970s.109 
In their own words, President Bush and Cheney had a long-
standing desire “to leave the presidency stronger than they found 
it.”110 This assertion of this view of executive authority neverthe-
less ran the risk of “achiev[ing] the opposite” by cultivating “a 
harmful suspicion and mistrust.”111 Cheney, at a minimum, was 
quite aware that “personal leadership, public education, political 
support, and interbranch comity” all might be determinants of 
executive power.112 But he nevertheless advanced Article II 
grounds, even though they raised unnecessary, costly, and divi-
sive objections to immediate policy choices, because they 
advanced the institutional authority of the presidency.113 
The example of Cheney is an interesting one for our purposes 
because his fidelity to the executive branch was evident both 
when he sat in the White House and also while he was a member 
of the House of Representatives. It is worth remembering that 
Cheney started his career in the White House as an assistant to 
Donald Rumsfeld in the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1969–
1970. He rose to the position of White House chief of staff for 
President Gerald Ford before he ever set foot in Congress.114  
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It is consistent with our view of institutional loyalties that 
Cheney seems to have formulated strong views about the execu-
tive branch as an employee of the executive branch and then 
maintained those views even as he moved to a different branch of 
government. Hence, the fact that Representative Cheney held the 
same views as Chief of Staff Cheney and Vice President Cheney 
does not undermine our claim; rather, it shows the potential for 
institutional loyalties to stick notwithstanding transitions be-
tween different branches of government.  
Of course, this need not always be the case. There are other 
famous instances of interbranch transition—think of Chief 
Justice John Marshall, who served in the House, the Adams 
administration, and on the Court,115 or Chief Justice Roger 
Taney116—not characterized by the same tenacity of initial insti-
tutional fidelity. 
While Cheney and his colleagues were motivated by an insti-
tutional loyalty to expand the power of the executive branch, 
other cabinet officials and senior political appointees resisted some 
of their efforts because of their institutional loyalties. Attorney 
General Ashcroft was a former Republican governor and senator 
who was “controversial because of his impassioned advocacy of 
conservative causes.”117 As he lay in an intensive care unit in the 
hospital on the night of March 10, 2004, though, Ashcroft 
summoned the energy to resist White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales and Chief of Staff Andrew Card when they asked him 
to reauthorize a domestic surveillance program. Ashcroft later 
testified and wrote that he refused to sign because he believed the 
program to be legally flawed. He was supported by Comey, who 
in his own testimony indicated that he believed the White House 
to be usurping the institutional role of the Department of Justice 
in deciding what is legal.118 
Institutional loyalty, moreover, is not the preserve of one ad-
ministration or one party. In 2011, Obama determined that he did 
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not need congressional authorization under the War Powers 
Resolution119 to continue air strikes in Libya.120 This conclusion 
was resisted by two political appointees—Jeh Johnson, the 
general counsel of the Department of Defense, and Caroline 
Krass, the acting head of the OLC at the Department of Justice.121 
Johnson had been a political appointee during the Clinton admin-
istration, had raised money and campaigned for past Democratic 
presidential nominees,122 and would later serve as secretary of 
Homeland Security for Obama. Krass had previously served as a 
special advisor to Obama,123 and would later become his general 
counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).124 Despite these 
partisan commitments, though, both Johnson and Krass argued 
to Obama that his legal conclusions were incorrect, and a former 
head of the OLC, Walter Dellinger, criticized the president’s 
“unusual process” of rejecting OLC and other legal advice from 
within the executive branch as problematic.125 In so doing, they 
reflected an institutional alignment at odds with traditional 
stories of partisanship and ideology.126 
2. The judiciary. 
Two recent examples highlight the possibility of institutional 
loyalty among federal judges. A first high-salience example of a 
justice acting against perceived ideological preferences as a result 
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of what apparently were institutional concerns is, as noted previ-
ously, Roberts’s alleged switch to vote in favor of upholding the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act127 (ACA) in National 
Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius128 (“NFIB”). 
Commentators immediately characterized Roberts’s decision as 
“a brilliant act of judicial statesmanship” that shielded the Court, 
as an institution, from accusation of partisan bias.129 Roberts’s 
vote, we think, is hard to explain purely in terms of his known 
ideological preferences.130 Consistent with that view, many 
conservative commentators subsequently condemned the chief 
justice in no uncertain terms as an ideological turncoat.131 
Although it is not possible to say with certainty what motivated 
Roberts, we think that institutional loyalties are plausibly 
thought to have played a role. 
Similarly, in the wake of Justice Antonin Scalia’s untimely 
death in 2016, the chief justice, and other justices, made seem-
ingly concerted efforts to “find consensus whenever possible” by 
avoiding 4–4 splits and reducing the number of disputes in its 
pipeline.132 In Zubik v Burwell,133 the justices were asked to decide 
whether regulations issued pursuant to the ACA, mandating that 
employers provide contraception coverage to women violated the 
statutory rights of nonprofit religious employers.134 Just two years 
earlier, the Court divided 5–4 in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc135 about the related issue of whether the mandate unduly bur-
dened the religious freedoms of for-profit corporations.136 
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By the time oral argument transpired on March 23, 2016, 
Scalia had died, leaving a likely 4–4 split on the Court.137 Obama 
had also nominated Garland of the US Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit to replace Scalia, leading to Republican 
opposition and placing the Court in the midst of the heated polit-
ical debate in a presidential election year yet again.138 Less than 
one week after oral argument, the eight justices unanimously 
“issued an unusual order”139 directing the parties to file supple-
mental briefs finding a compromise outcome that both sides 
would find agreeable.140 In May, the Court issued an unsigned 
unanimous opinion remanding the case to the lower courts to find 
an acceptable compromise order.141 
As in the NFIB case, the justices appeared to behave in ways 
inconsistent with their ideological preferences (that is, their sin-
cerely held opinions about the substance of the law), and instead 
consonant with the interests of the judiciary as an institution. A 
polarized and deadlocked Court avoided dividing on ideological or 
jurisprudential grounds in order to preserve the public perception 
of the Court as above and independent of politics. This was 
certainly the interpretation of the opinion by many of those who 
follow the Supreme Court most closely.142 Indeed, Justice Elena 
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Kagan confirmed this interpretation during a subsequent public 
appearance.143 
3. Congress. 
Examples of institutional loyalty influencing the collective 
action of either Congress or a single chamber are more difficult to 
discern than their judicial- or executive-branch analogs. A threshold 
problem is that in many instances, Congress asserts its interests 
by what Professor David Mayhew calls “non-levering”—that is, 
exercising a veto by nonaction.144 There are many examples, to be 
sure, of legislative assertions of institutional prerogative as a 
means toward a partisan end. For example, the Senate’s refusal 
to hold confirmation hearings for Obama’s nomination for the 
Supreme Court vacancy left by Scalia’s sudden demise sounds in 
institutional prerogative. Similarly, a lawsuit filed by the House 
of Representatives challenging expenditures on the ACA has 
resulted in a district-court opinion that endorses a legislative 
power to challenge violations of the Appropriations Clause.145 But 
we think both are better understood as partisan initiatives with 
small positive institutional spillovers.146 
Better examples of institutional loyalty on Congress’s part 
focus on costly legislative acts that have little immediate partisan 
or electoral payoff, but that have enabled the legislative branch 
as a whole to pursue its identified interests in the long term. That 
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is, when a legislative action produces little or no certain short-
term policy effect, but in the long term enables Congress, it is 
more likely to be explained by institutionally oriented motives. 
The leading comparative study of institutional design changes 
within Congress, by political scientist Professor Schickler, high-
lights the plurality of motives that underscore many legislative 
acts.147 Notwithstanding that finding, Schickler identifies several 
instances in which what we call institutional loyalties were deci-
sive (if not uniquely at play). The first of these is the LRA, which 
“sought to enhance Congress’s position relative to the executive 
by strengthening congressional committees and by providing new 
integrative devices, such as party policy committees and a 
centralized budget process, to coordinate committee activities.”148 
As we have noted, the LRA slimmed the number of committees in 
both the House and the Senate as a means to empowering more 
effective congressional oversight. To that end, it also authorized 
additional staff to help professionalize legislators’ offices.149 
Congressional debates show that legislators were concerned by 
the disjunction between a rapidly expanding executive branch 
and a Congress that had “relatively stood still.”150 This “remarka-
bly consistent message from Democrats and Republicans across 
the ideological spectrum” about Article I power and “prestige” 
helped enact a measure that stripped many members of the 
perquisites of committee leadership and membership—that is, 
diluted their personal power without advancing an ideological or 
partisan goal.151 The LRA’s history is also striking in that it is 
characterized by a bipartisan recognition of the positive role that 
government plays—in contrast to the relentless attacks on gov-
ernment from Republicans in particular since the 1980s. 
But the 1946 Act is not the only instance of Congress acting 
in its own defense that Schickler identifies. Between 1889 and 
1990, he finds that at least nine out of forty-two institutional 
reforms in Congress were motivated in part by what he calls 
“Congress or chamber-oriented interests” as distinct from party 
interests, policy interests, and reelection-related interests.152 In 
 
 147 Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism at 12–13 (cited in note 22) (noting the presence of 
“multiple interests” behind many institutional changes). 
 148 Id at 14. 
 149 Id at 146–50 (explaining why this was not a “cartelistic” move by the majority). 
 150 Id at 141–42, citing S 2177, 79th Cong, 2d Sess (May 13, 1946), in 92 Cong Rec 
6558 (June 10, 1946) (statement of Sen Bridges). 
 151 Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism at 142–43 (cited in note 22). 
 152 Id at 256. 
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addition to the LRA, Schickler identifies appropriations and 
Senate committee reform in the 1920s, the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy of 1946, and the Stevenson committee reforms of 
1977 as relevant examples.153 The Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, for instance, was created after World War II as a joint 
body with members from both the House and Senate exercising 
sole jurisdiction, sole power to report relevant legislation, and 
important oversight powers over the vital and growing postwar 
policy question of how to manage atomic energy.154 Like the LRA, 
the Joint Committee emerged from a bipartisan consensus that 
Congress needed the institutional capacity to keep up with regu-
latory growth within the executive.155 In short, the “middle to late 
twentieth century” was a particularly fruitful period for such 
reforms, as Congress endeavored to respond systematically to 
increasing executive-branch authority.156 
In addition to Schickler’s examples, Professor Josh Chafetz’s 
recent survey of congressional powers identifies the creation of 
the General Accounting Office and the Senate’s defense of its 
prerogatives in relation to treaties as instances of legislative self-
assertion that are not well explained by partisan or ideological 
motives.157 The former, created in 1920, was intended to fashion a 
new accounting department that would be accountable “only to 
Congress” and that would give Congress “the very facts that 
Congress ought to be in possession of.”158 Building on Chafetz’s 
list, we think that the Congressional Budgeting Office, which is 
tasked with issuing estimates of how much proposed legislation 
will cost the federal fisc, is an institutional innovation that re-
flects institutional rather than partisan or ideological interests.159 
 
 153 Id at 257. 
 154 Id at 150–51. 
 155 Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism at 152–53 (cited in note 22). Indeed, Schickler 
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 156 Id at 257. See also Mayhew, The Imprint of Congress at 115 (cited in note 144) 
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that enough is enough.”). 
 157 Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution at 31, 63 (cited in note 10). 
 158 Thomas D. Morgan, The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Congress to 
Regain Parity of Power with the President, 51 NC L Rev 1279, 1281 (1973), quoting 66th 
Cong, 1st Sess (Oct 17, 1919), in 58 Cong Rec 7085 (remarks of Rep Good). 
 159 For details of the Congressional Budget Office’s operation, see Philip G. Joyce, The 
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Some scholars have identified the federal budgeting process 
as a “centralizing change intended to safeguard congressional 
power.”160 In 1974, provoked by President Richard Nixon’s 
aggressive use of impoundment authority, Congress passed the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974,161 which 
provided a framework for coordinated committee consideration of 
expenditures, and a predictable set of mechanisms for legislative 
deliberation over the final packet of budget proposals.162 At its 
heart was the new annual congressional budget resolution, which 
set forth “overall national fiscal policies” at the beginning of the 
budgeting process, thereby enabling coordination toward a final 
appropriations measure.163 Although these new procedures can be 
glossed as means of empowering Congress as an institution, they 
can also be seen as a mechanism for empowering members of 
budget committees while increasing the time in which members 
could seek payoffs consistent with game-theoretic models of self-
serving legislative behavior.164 Although Schickler does find evi-
dence of institutional motives in relation to the 1974 Budget Act, 
we think the force of parochial interests may be stronger here 
than in the other cases mentioned above. 
Finally, Professors Adrian Vermeule and Cass Sunstein have 
recently suggested that the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act165 
(APA) is similarly a historical “compromise” between proregula-
tory and antiregulatory forces, which is not “generally and 
systematically progressive, or proregulatory, or anything else.”166 
If they are correct, the APA should be understood as a farsighted 
investment in a legal framework that enabled Congress to achieve 
its shifting regulatory goals without having to create a basic legal 
framework from the ground up each time it did so. Professor 
Elizabeth Garrett has identified other forms of “framework 
legislation” that Congress has enacted and still enforces that 
 
 160 Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism at 8 (cited in note 22). 
 161 Pub L No 93-344, 88 Stat 297, codified at 2 USC § 601 et seq. 
 162 2 USC § 601 et seq. See also Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The 
Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 Cal L Rev 593, 615–17 (1988) (discussing circum-
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could be described in a similar fashion to budgetary legislation or 
the APA.167 
Although we have assembled examples of institutional loy-
alty manifesting within Congress, we do not wish to exaggerate 
the force of our claim. It may once have been the case that 
Congress engaged in robust self-defense of its institutional pre-
rogatives168 by (among other things) resisting judicial orders of 
which it disapproved.169 But it is striking that all of our examples 
are relatively removed from the contemporary moment. This sug-
gests that institutional loyalties have eroded over time as a result 
of many forces, both within and outside Congress.170 Today, only 
a pale shadow of their former force may be felt. 
* * * 
Institutional loyalty can be observed motivating recent ac-
tions of all three of the branches. Each of our examples highlights 
an instance in which loyalty prevailed against countervailing 
partisan or ideological concerns. Our examples not only provide 
evidence of institutional loyalty but also show how the latter 
influences officials’ ultimate actions, notwithstanding partisan or 
ideological preferences. Because we have selected relatively high-
profile examples, we are confident that institutional loyalties 
cannot be written off as a marginal phenomenon: they are instead 
a meaningful element of contemporary separation-of-powers 
dynamics. 
Our examples, however, leave open the questions of why and 
how the strength of institutional loyalties has fluctuated over 
time and how such changes have interacted with shifts in parti-
san and ideological attachment. It seems likely that the core claim 
 
 167 See Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J Contemp 
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litigation, its resulting cancellation of the Supreme Court’s 1802 term, and its refusal to 
honor a Court order to turn over documents concerning the Marbury appointment). 
 170 See, for example, Neal Devins, The Constitutional Politics of Congress, in Mark 
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of the modern position—that ideological and partisan loyalties 
dominate—is itself a contingent historical artifact of the ebbing 
strength of institutional loyalties. Indeed, one benefit of bringing 
to bear the concept of institutional loyalties is that it casts light 
on the process of motivational change within the political elites 
charged with managing the three branches of government. 
For example, rates of both partisan polarization among polit-
ical elites and party discipline within Congress have changed 
markedly over time171 in ways that may have influenced the 
strength of institutional loyalties. Polarization, for example, ar-
guably undermines legislators’ willingness to pursue institutional 
rather than partisan ends as party leadership exercise greater 
agenda control in pursuit of distinct and ideologically incompati-
ble agendas.172 On the other hand, the decline of institutional 
loyalties—say as a result of increasingly lucrative exit options for 
former members of Congress—may have contributed to the grow-
ing force of partisan and ideological preferences. The interaction 
between partisan or ideological motives and institutional loyal-
ties provides a motor driving changes to institutional behavior 
over time. It would thus be a mistake to describe the motivations 
of key actors in our constitutional system as static, rather than as 
dynamic and evolving over time. 
II.  THE SOURCES OF INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY 
If institutional loyalty is neither impossible nor inevitable, 
how does it come to be in the first instance? This Part focuses on 
the question of how institutional loyalties arise. Our aim here is 
to identify and loosely categorize the discrete choices made by the 
designer of a constitution, or of important national institutions, 
that make officials either more or less likely to identify with and 
seek to promote the goals of their institutional home. We identify 
two relevant margins of design. Each can be manipulated in two 
different ways. 
First, we explore the influence of institutional design on the 
selection of institutional personnel. Institutional designers have 
 
 171 For information on political polarization among political elites, see Richard H. Pildes, 
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a large measure of control over entrance and exit rules. The terms 
of entrance and exit by officials into an institution, therefore, 
select not only on the kind of officials who opt into the institution 
in the first instance, but also the extent to which they remain long 
enough to develop institutional loyalty.173 
Second, we posit that officials’ preferences are shaped and 
regulated by organizational socialization, and in particular the 
social context in which they operate. Social context, operating 
both within and around an institution, can foster “durable, trans-
posable dispositions . . . [that in turn will] generate and organize 
practices” by which branches, agencies, and organizations imple-
ment missions.174 We explore two mechanisms through which 
institutional designers can use organizational socialization to 
promote loyalty and identification with an institution. First, the 
choice of institutional mandate can influence the extent of such 
identification. Second, we explore how institutional designers can 
harness, and even seed, wider social networks that surround an 
institution, generating or reinforcing positive (or negative) loyalty 
toward an institution. 
All these mechanisms can operate at the level of constitu-
tional design, understood as the written work product of the 
Philadelphia Convention and successive amendment. Because 
the 1787 Constitution does not comprehensively describe the full 
institutional landscape of the federal government, however, it 
also leaves ample room for legislators and presidents to develop 
the “small-‘c’” constitution, which comprises “the fundamental 
political institutions of a society, or the constitution in practice.”175 
As a result of the Constitution’s incompleteness, many possible 
avenues for institutional reform (some of which are identified in 
Part III) remain open. We hence sketch here mechanisms that are 
available both to constitutional drafters and more mundane 
administrators of government. 
 
 173 Many legal rules “produce feedback effects that, over time, bring new types of gov-
ernment officials into power.” Vermeule, 91 Va L Rev at 953 (cited in note 25). We are 
concerned with a narrower class of selection-related rules. 
 174 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice 53 (Polity 1990) (Richard Nice, trans). 
Pierre Bourdieu called this a “habitus.” Id (emphasis omitted). Our analysis is consistent 
with Bourdieu’s frame although we do not employ that relatively unfamiliar terminology. 
 175 David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv L Rev 
1457, 1459–60 (2001). 
40 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1 
 
A. Entrance and Promotion Rules 
A first means to elicit institutionally disposed officials is to 
employ devices for regulating the threshold choice of official hires 
in ways that sort the institutionally minded from those with self-
serving or ideological or partisan motives, and to ensure that only 
the former are promoted within the organization.176 Some (but not 
all) of the design options described in this Section operate through 
a demand for a costly signal. Such measures leverage the insight 
that when the cost of a qualification “is negatively correlated with 
the unseen characteristic that is valuable to the employers,” it can 
be used to distinguish “good” types (who easily acquire it) from 
“bad” types (who do not find getting the qualification worth-
while).177 In addition to devices that select for more institutionally 
minded candidates, an institutional designer can sculpt criteria 
for promotion—that is, the shape of the job ladder—to select 
right-minded individuals. We begin by exploring selection 
mechanisms in the constitutional context, before using statutory 
examples to illustrate other mechanisms not identified or used in 
the Constitution’s text. 
As noted, Madison, in Federalist 51, asserted that “[t]he in-
terest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights 
of the place.”178 The balance of The Federalist Papers reveals scant 
attention, however, to the important question of how this connec-
tion would be made. In contrast, Publius pays close attention to 
how selection rules for the branches conduce to virtuous officials. 
In Federalist 10, most famously, Madison developed a theory of 
the “extended” republic, in which the process of representation 
would dilute local factions and “refine and enlarge the public 
views.”179 As we discussed in Part I, though, virtuous officials are 
not necessarily those with institutional loyalty.180 
At best, Publius’s argument offers mere hints of how institu-
tional loyalty might be produced by selection. In Federalist 57, 
Madison suggested that an elected official’s “pride and vanity 
 
 176 See Vermeule, 91 Va L Rev at 956–57 (cited in note 25). 
 177 Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets, 
92 Am Econ Rev 434, 437 (2002) (emphasis added). See also Michael Spence, Job Market 
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[would] attach him to a form of government which favors his pre-
tensions, and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions,”181 
perhaps including those of an institutional character. Madison in 
Federalist 62 glosses the pre–Seventeenth Amendment regime of 
state legislative power to appoint senators not only as a way of 
“giving to the state governments . . . an agency in . . . the federal 
government”182 but also as a means of picking senators with “due 
acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation.”183 The 
latter phrase might be glossed (with some difficulty) as an 
inclination to attend to the rights and interests of a legislating 
institution. Finally, Hamilton emphasized in Federalist 78 that 
Article III judges would be appointed via the same method as 
principal officers of the executive branch—and also praised 
judges for their expected quality of “judgment.”184 Although this 
again might be read as evidence of selection for an institutional 
loyalty, it also suggests an optimistic view of the filtering power 
of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.185 
We do not think that these hints add up to a complete account 
of the Constitution’s selection mechanisms as a means for 
promoting institutional identification. Nor do we think such a 
comprehensive theory, explaining how the Constitution selects 
for both public virtue and institutional loyalty, can be developed 
from the constitutional text alone. As Professor Joanne Freeman 
has explained, it is not obvious that the Framers’ ideas about re-
publican virtue can be reconciled entirely with their commitment 
to representative democracy.186 Trying to knead their invocations 
of public virtue into claims about institutional loyalty seems even 
more implausible. As a theorist of institutional loyalty as a matter 
of constitutional design, therefore, Publius falls far short. 
Other constitutional designers have done better. In many 
other jurisdictions, the judiciary is organized as a form of civil 
service with lifetime career paths. Career judiciaries rely on 
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costly signals insofar as they demand that judges renounce poten-
tially lucrative private careers early in their professional lives. By 
building job ladders within the judiciary, career judiciaries also 
align the professional ambitions of judges with the goals of the 
court system as a whole. In Germany, for example, Professor John 
Langbein characterized the judiciary as a prestigious career 
choice, open only to those with the “best” academic credentials in 
their study in programs dedicated to the law, with partisan 
considerations playing a “very subordinate” role.187 Promotion de-
pended on meritocratic evaluation by peer judges, with partisan 
considerations playing a much lesser role. 
Langbein, the leading American commentator on the German 
judicial system, reaches an unequivocal judgment: its career path 
attracts the “very able” to the bench and then assures that “career 
advancement [is] congruent with the legitimate interests of the 
litigants.”188 The German judiciary, in short, selects for and culti-
vates an institutional loyalty by orienting its officials toward 
excellence in the performance of the institution’s central task: 
settling disputes fairly. Of course, mere installation of a career 
judiciary is no panacea.189 Rather, we flag the German example as 
evidence that other constitutional designers may have identified 
ways of eliciting desirable institutional loyalty among civil 
servants. 
Institutional loyalty might also be cultivated, or diminished, 
through statutory selection mechanisms. The modern American 
civil service has a series of rules that embody both costly entrance 
mechanisms and also promotion schemes that entangle individual 
and institutional ambitions. Contrary to the standard “starting 
point in analyzing politicians’ behaviors[,] that they are socially 
motivated,”190 careful attention to these schemes shows how extant 
statutory frameworks carefully cultivate institutional loyalty. 
Starting with the Pendleton Act of 1883,191 statutory civil-
service laws have contained filtration mechanisms, such as 
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competitive entrance exams.192 The current merit hiring process 
for the federal civil service requires that career positions are filled 
based on objective skill and experience.193 These threshold 
mechanisms make long-term government service less attractive 
for those with strong partisan or pecuniary motives, but lacking 
in relevant skills or subject-matter expertise. As a result, these 
screens narrow the pool of applicants to those most likely to 
internalize an institutional loyalty, even if applicants themselves 
are unlikely to have such loyalty before taking on a government 
position. 
In addition to navigating these screens, professional civil 
servants must forgo the greater compensation typically available 
in the private sector when choosing to enter public service. 
Lawyers, engineers, scientists, and accountants all earn far less 
than their counterparts in the private sector.194 This public/private 
salary differential has two effects. Like competitive exams, it 
again selects against certain types (for example, those primarily 
motivated by personal pecuniary motives). And by ousting high-
powered incentives,195 it also preserves space for other forms of 
motivation. Institutional ambitions and norms are, as a result, 
far more likely to infuse the preferences and behavior of officials 
than would be the case absent the civil-service regime’s con-
straints on political and pecuniary motives.196 
 
 192 The Pendleton Act’s competitive exam structure, however, was not mandatory. See 
Pendleton Act § 2, 22 Stat at 403–04. 
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These threshold mechanisms can be complemented by a 
promotion structure that elicits institutional loyalty even more 
actively. Promotions depend on “seniority and the passage of 
time, rather than on productivity,” or evidence of skill.197 Partisan 
and pecuniary motives are excluded as grounds of official action 
by the civil-service laws. The 1939 Hatch Act198 ensured that “em-
ployment and advancement in the Government service [does] not 
depend on political performance,”199 just as the honest services 
law rules out self-interested pecuniary motives among elected of-
ficials.200 Legal historian Nicholas Parrillo has charted the demise 
of profit as a motivating force within the federal bureaucracy as 
fees and bounties gradually fell into desuetude, to be supplanted 
by fixed, outcome-independent salaries.201 To the extent that sal-
ary competition does occur now, it is channeled through a central-
ized system of classifications of different bureaucratic positions 
for salary purposes—a context in which institutional priorities 
are highly influential.202 
Finally, once partisan and pecuniary motives are taken off 
the table, civil servants also tend to have long careers closely tied 
to their home institutions. Turnover in federal employment is 
low. In each year between 2004 and 2012, data from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) shows that about 0.7 percent of 
federal employees were fired, between 2.4 to 3 percent resigned, 
and between 2.5 and 3.6 percent retired.203 While OMB does not 
retain distinct data on rates of internal promotion and hiring, this 
exceedingly low rate of exit (around 7 percent) suggests that pro-
motion from outside the federal bureaucracy is relatively rare. 
The sheer expected durability of federal employment tends to 
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deepen identification with a home institution.204 Simply put, offi-
cials who anticipate that their career will be entangled with a 
specific institution have a reason to advance the interests of that 
institution qua institution.205 
B. Exit Rules 
Institutional loyalty can be elicited by imposing costs on offi-
cials’ exit from an institution. Costly institutional exit arises when 
officials incur high opportunity costs if they depart an institution 
or obtain low or artificially suppressed returns from external 
opportunities. As a result of the benefits of staying put and the 
costs of departure, officials are more likely to remain in their 
home institution, and concomitantly more likely to identify their 
career goals with the larger goals of the institution. Costly exit 
has been identified as an important mechanism in both the labor 
economics and the public administration literature.206 Its links to 
constitutional and statutory rules, not to mention its larger con-
stitutional function, have so far received insufficient attention. 
Costly exit mechanisms operate in two ways. First, high 
returns to serving in an institution increase the odds of longer 
terms of service. Longer civil-service tenures function in this 
regard akin to life tenure for federal judges. In expectation, such 
tenures increase the degree of identification between an official 
and the institution with which her career is entangled. Regard-
less of the length of intended institutional service, moreover, high 
returns from continued service can immediately benefit institu-
tions. An official receiving large returns to institutional service, 
like any well-compensated employee,207 is more likely to be well 
disposed to her institution, and hence more likely to formulate 
and adopt a view of what is in its best interest. 
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High returns, moreover, need not take a monetary form. 
Public officials can instead be motivated by the opportunity to 
shape policy or by reputational gains.208 High-ranking officials in 
all three branches of government are likely to have forsaken 
greater financial rewards in the private sector in order to receive 
returns from policy influence. Chief Justice Roberts, for instance, 
was earning more than $1 million every year in private practice 
in 2003 when he accepted President Bush’s nomination to the US 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and thereby 
embraced a position with roughly one-sixth the salary.209 His 
tenure protection and opportunities for policy-related discretion 
are one form of compensation for the opportunity costs of forgoing 
private practice. Indeed, to the extent that this effectual wage is 
greater than Roberts’s market wage, life tenure may comprise an 
implicit efficiency wage.210 
A constitutional designer can use policy influence as a com-
pensatory incentive in lieu of pecuniary rewards, and thereby 
elicit institutional loyalty. Article III judges, for example, cannot 
have their salary reduced while in office. Their salary is essen-
tially a lifetime guaranteed annuity so long as the judge is not 
impeached.211 This guarantee is justified as a (surely partial and 
imperfect) way of ensuring “an independent Judiciary”212 that is 
“free from control by the Executive and the Legislature.”213 
An institutional function is thus pursued through the shap-
ing of individual incentives. By assigning judges the opportunity 
to influence the path of the law as an important form of implicit 
compensation, the Constitution gives individual judges a stake in 
the judiciary as a whole. Their policy discretion depends on the 
judiciary’s continued prestige and legitimacy. As a result, judges 
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have a strong incentive to maintain the institutional predicates 
of policy influence. Further, the expectation of a durable judicial 
career means that even if a judge’s influence at a given moment 
in time is minimal, her opportunities for shaping the law can re-
occur over an extended period of time—resulting in an eventually 
significant amount of policy influence. 
Statutory regimes can also use the promise of policy influence 
to generate institutional loyalty. Agency designers can allocate 
either substantive powers or formal titles as means to assign both 
responsibility and influence to specific personnel.214 A recent 
example involves the reorganization of the intelligence services 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to include a new 
leadership position, a “Director of National Intelligence” (DNI).215 
The DNI was made by statute the head of the intelligence 
community, the primary adviser to the president on matters of 
intelligence related to national security, the authoritative voice 
on the intelligence budget, and the hiring authority for key offi-
cials in the intelligence community.216 Whereas the head of the 
intelligence community had formerly been the CIA chief, the new 
DNI is independent of any specific component of the intelligence 
bureaucracy.217 By augmenting the powers of the intelligence 
leadership position, while detaching it from any specific agency, 
members of Congress hoped to instill a larger, government-wide 
sense of mission in the office—one not dogged by the parochial 
concerns of a particular agency.218 Implicit in the DNI’s new pow-
ers, moreover, is the possibility that the office’s occupant would 
be blamed politically if the intelligence community failed to 
prevent another spectacular terrorist attack akin to 9/11. In this 
fashion, legislators may have hoped to align future DNIs’ per-
sonal interests with the executive’s larger mission of mitigating 
national security risks rather than more parochial institutional 
concerns. 
The force of such bureaucratic incentives, however, often 
depends on the strength and durability of the underlying agency. 
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Implicit compensation in the form of policy discretion for bureau-
crats works better with robust and enduring agencies than with 
weak and transient agencies. All else being equal, officials exer-
cising policy discretion as a form of implicit compensation thus 
have good reason to identify with and promote their institution’s 
persistence. There is a strong empirical connection between the 
extent to which an institution is insulated from presidential 
control and its durability.219 This suggests that an agency is less 
likely to attract and cultivate expertise if it is under close presi-
dential supervision because the marginal official will be uncer-
tain whether any context-specific expertise they accrue will be 
rendered valueless by the dissolution of the agency. Institutional 
loyalty toward a specific agency or department—and hence to the 
mission embodied in the statutes that agency is charged with 
enforcing—is undermined by structural controls that increase a 
president’s control and influence.220 The weaker presidential 
removal authority, the more durable an agency and the more 
likely its officials are to invest in expertise. 
The second species of costly exit mechanism takes the form of 
rules that inhibit or even bar exit, especially to positions that pro-
vide higher returns than continued government service. Officials 
are more inclined to identify with their institutions if there is no 
alternative career pathway, such that they are more likely to pur-
sue a longer career within government. Lower returns from exit 
can result if officials have institution-specific investments that 
are not transferable either to another institution within govern-
ment or to the private sector.221 Low returns to exit can also result 
from formal, legal prohibitions to exit. We consider each of these 
possibilities in turn. 
Most obviously, institutional designers make exit costly by 
simple prohibitions on the utilization of any capital obtained 
while an official within an institution. More institution-specific 
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investments are encouraged, by contrast, when substantial 
portions of capital obtained from working within the institution 
cannot be monetized on departure. The Ethics Reform Act of 
1989,222 for example, bars former members of Congress from lob-
bying for a year;223 a measure recently extended this prohibition 
to two years for senators.224 Congress’s failure to bar lobbying of 
agencies supervised by an individual legislator, however, may 
render these prohibitions functionally ineffectual.225 On his first 
day in office in 2009, President Obama issued an executive order 
barring federal employees from a wide range of lobbying activities 
for two years.226 The following year, he barred lobbyists from serv-
ing on federal boards.227 Such measures aim to gum up the 
“revolving door” between government and the private sector.228 
When successful, they lower the opportunity cost of remaining in 
public service by lowering the expected payoffs of exit. When dis-
carded, they diminish institutional allegiance in favor of baser 
concerns. 
The second mechanism is less obvious. It relies on a connection 
between expertise acquisition and costly exit. Federal officials 
develop institution-specific human capital by maintaining 
responsibility for matters not routinely addressed by other public 
or private institutions.229 The design of federal civil-service laws 
often facilitates the acquisition of context-specific human capital 
by employees, that is, expertise and knowledge tightly wound into 
the specific aims and policy goals of their home agency. Civil serv-
ants generally do not enter their positions with the knowledge 
and skills needed to pursue institutional goals. Even a system of 
merit selection will not select for the “most meritorious” employ-
ees in the potential applicant pool unless the applicants “believe 
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that their efforts and expertise will be applied to pursue goals” 
that they share.230 Such expertise is often “relationship specific” 
and “specifically tailored” to the operational environment and 
goals of a particular agency.231 Tenure protection induces officials 
to invest in that bespoke human capital.232 By inducing the acqui-
sition of institution-specific expertise, the civil-service regime 
thus helps create a cadre of officials whose professional standing, 
and whose specific expertise, is tightly linked to the specific 
agenda and policy goals of their institution. These officials are, all 
else being equal, likely to rank the institution’s goals very high. 
Consider, for instance, the Office of the Legal Adviser in the 
Department of State, or “L,” an office renowned for the institu-
tional orientation of its lawyers, even in comparison to some other 
legal offices within the executive branch.233 Many attorneys there 
work on matters of public international law, a field with little sub-
stantial presence in other parts of the federal government, state 
governments, or the private sector. Lawyers in L also invest in 
social networks related to public international law through organ-
izations like the American Society for International Law. As we 
explain below,234 this generates human capital within that office 
that is not as easily transferable even compared to that acquired 
in other forms of government legal service. The result is longer 
tenures within L,235 and deeper identifications with that office and 
the executive branch’s foreign policy missions more generally 
than otherwise might be the case.236 
Finally, the development of institution-specific human 
capital helps elucidate why political appointees tend over time to 
develop agency-level institutional loyalty that can overpower par-
tisan loyalty. Presidential appointees rely on agency staff for 
 
 230 Sean Gailmard and John W. Patty, Learning while Governing: Expertise and 
Accountability in the Executive Branch 130–31 (Chicago 2013). 
 231 Id at 33. 
 232 Gailmard and Patty, 51 Am J Polit Sci at 881 (cited in note 206). 
 233 See David Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 126 Harv L Rev F 21, 40–41 (2012). 
 234 See text accompanying notes 270–73. 
 235 See Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office: Eight 
Decades in Peace and War, 100 Georgetown L J 1747, 1749 (2012) (“[T]he heart of L has 
been the dedicated career lawyers. . . . One measure of the relative importance of these 
two sets of positions is that . . . the longest-serving Legal Adviser [ ] served fifteen years 
. . . [b]ut many career attorneys . . . have served in L for years longer than that.”). See also 
Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic 95–110 (Belknap 2010) 
(discussing the OLC’s incentives). 
 236 Fontana, 126 Harv L Rev F at 40–41 (cited in note 233). 
2018] Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law 51 
 
knowledge and expertise on policy questions.237 By becoming 
immersed in and acquainted with a complex body of rules, those 
appointees also make personal investments in an epistemic 
resource that is specific to a particular institution (the judiciary 
or an agency).238 This asset-specific investment then ties the offi-
cial’s interests to those of the agency in which he or she is embed-
ded. As a result, political appointees have been known to defect 
from the partisan or ideological agenda of the official’s putative 
executive-branch sponsor.239 
C. Institutional Mandates 
We turn next to the first of two ways in which constitutional 
designers can take advantage of organizational socialization to 
generate institutional loyalty. Unlike entrance and exit rules, or-
ganizational socialization operates as a “treatment effect” rather 
than a selection effect.240 In the following two Sections, that is, we 
are concerned with ways in which the design of an institution can 
influence an individual’s perception of, and tendency to identify 
with, her home institution. Our basic claim is that an institution’s 
dominant architectural elements can elicit an internal culture in 
which institutional loyalty will thrive. 
We begin by isolating a simple element of institutional 
design—institutional mandate—as a significant determinant of 
institutional loyalty. The stronger an institution’s mandate, we 
suggest, the more likely institutional loyalty will emerge. We then 
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explore how different design choices observed in either constitu-
tional or statutory contexts either diminish or augment relevant 
social networks. 
1. Defining and cultivating institutional mandates. 
Governmental institutions—whether a branch or an entity 
within a branch—are typically understood by participants and 
observers alike to have a set of purposes or functions. These con-
stitute the institution’s mandate. An institution’s mandate need 
not be articulated in a constitution or an organic statute, although 
they often are. Institutional loyalty can be understood in terms of 
officials’ endorsement of those purposes and functions into their 
own preference sets. 
An institutional mandate can be created by the constitutional 
provision or statute that creates an institution. Alternatively, it 
might be a result of policy entrepreneurship by agency leaders 
with strong policy agendas.241 Institutional leadership can expend 
resources priming new officials on the importance of particular 
functions or aims. They can equip new appointees with the 
epistemic resources and practical capability to understand and 
execute a mandate. Even when not backed by such investments, 
both written and informal mandates can serve as “focal points,” 
helping to coordinate actors’ expectations and behavior in light of 
some institutional ends and not others.242 Common knowledge of 
the agency’s mandate, for instance, may provide a basis for coor-
dination among officials who otherwise have little knowledge of 
peers in physically remote offices or functionally separate divi-
sions of the agency. Such coordination, Professors Tiberiu Dragu 
and Mattias Polborn have recently demonstrated, is particularly 
important in maintaining the rule of law against the efforts of 
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potentially autocratic leaders.243 When administrators expect 
each other to resist unlawful policies, they show formally, legal 
constraints on political leaders are more likely to be self-
enforcing.244 
Of importance to our analysis, an institution’s mandate need 
not be unitary. By substantive command or via the imposition of 
procedural obligations,245 an agency can be tasked with a plurality 
of goals. There is not a sharp divide between unitary and plural 
mandates, but rather a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, an 
entity might be assigned a substantively narrow obligation that 
requires little by way of discretionary judgment or expertise. The 
institution’s objections also may be connected to official action by 
a relatively short causal chain. A DMV tasked solely with exam-
ining potential drivers and distributing permits to them has 
something of this character. 
At the other end of the spectrum, an entity might have sev-
eral, potentially conflicting goals that relate to official actions 
through long and uncertain causal chains.246 The Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), for example, is “charged both with ensur-
ing that new drugs placed on the market are safe and effective (a 
task that generally requires cautious and deliberate action) and 
with speedily granting access for doctors and patients to those 
new, safe, and effective drugs (a task that requires expeditious 
review of those drugs).”247 The FDA, when pursuing these conflict-
ing mandates of safety and public health, necessarily makes 
compromises between incommensurable ends. 
The key point for (big-c or small-c) constitutional designers 
is that the internal heterogeneity of an institutional mandate 
influences the extent to which officials are likely, or even able, to 
formulate institutional loyalty. The more plural and the more ab-
stract an entity’s goals, the more disagreement there is likely to 
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arise even among insiders about how best to carry out its man-
date. In the stylized examples we have just offered, it is much 
easier (and hence less costly) to discern the institutional mandate 
for the DMV branch office than for the FDA. Entities with more 
diverse institutional mandates, accordingly, are less likely to be 
populated by officials with institutional loyalty than entities with 
singular and unitary mandates.248 
The effect of institutional architecture on mandates is evi-
dent both at a constitutional level and a statutory level. With the 
Constitution, both single- and multiple-mandate branches can be 
observed. Textualist constitutional scholars draw a distinction 
between a “unitary” executive and the “plural” judiciary and 
legislature.249 Although the force of this textual argument can be 
disputed,250 the simple contrast between unitary and plural 
branches plainly has some force. The relatively hierarchical struc-
ture of the executive juxtaposes with the relatively flat structure 
of the legislative branch, in which each legislator’s vote formally 
has the same weight within a given chambers. It is thus no sur-
prise we commonly talk of the “Obama” or “Trump” presidency, 
and not (usually) the Ryan/McConnell Congress.251 Those labels 
suggest a widely shared belief that (1) there is a singular measure 
of branch-level performance for Article II and (2) successes and 
failures can be attached to a specific officeholder for the executive, 
but not Congress. 
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Even if two institutions have the same functions, the way in 
which they execute that function can influence the extent of rele-
vant officials’ loyalty and zeal in pursuing that function. Consider 
the distinct ways in which the executive and the legislative medi-
ate political competition. The quadrennial presidential election 
provides for the diachronic alteration of power between partisan 
factions. Effectual political power under Article II comes in a 
unitary package, which changes hands periodically. By contrast, 
while Congress too has periodic elections, its plurality and heter-
ogeneity invite an additional element of synchronic political 
competition. The simultaneous possession of political power by 
plural, adverse factions generates barriers to the identification of 
a shared Article I mandate precisely because Congress folds in 
partisan divisions in a way the White House does not. This is no 
accident: the housing of political contestation is now recognized 
as a central function of democratic legislatures.252 Hence, even 
though Congress and the presidency have a similar democratic 
mandate—channeling political conflict into formal, legal out-
comes—differences in how that mandate is configured over time 
radically influence their expected institutional loyalty. 
Once more, it would be a mistake to think that the federal 
constitution exhausts the range of possible configurations that 
might elicit strong institutional mandates. Consider the possibil-
ity of a single-mission branch. Absent from our national organic 
document, this idea is pursued with vigor at the state constitu-
tional level. In that context, executive power is often “unbundled” 
into mandate-specific offices, each of which is subject to separate 
election.253 A majority of states thus directly elect an attorney 
general, a lieutenant governor, and a secretary of state, as well as 
a governor.254 This unbundling of functions into distinct executive 
bodies will in expectation amplify institutional loyalty: for it is 
much easier for an official within an unbundled executive to 
 
 252 Professor Jeremy Waldron has recently underscored the “institutional responsi-
bility” of an opposition party to “oppose, to scrutinize the government, to hold them 
accountable for their decisions.” Jeremy Waldron, Political Political Theory: Essays on 
Institutions 101 (Harvard 2016). Many constitutions outside the United States formalize 
this role through what are termed “government in opposition rules.” David Fontana, 
Government in Opposition, 119 Yale L J 548, 563 (2009). When those are adopted, we 
suspect that institutional loyalty in the legislative branch is correspondingly more difficult 
to get off the ground. 
 253 Gersen, 96 Va L Rev at 309–10 (cited in note 79). 
 254 Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U Chi L 
Rev 1385, 1433 (2008) (documenting state-level practice). 
56 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1 
 
identify and align herself with a singular goal (for example, crime 
control or the efficient provision of social services) than it is for 
an official within a bundled executive to assemble an institutional 
loyalty. 
In the administrative-law context, in which both single- and 
multiple-mandate agencies abound, there is ample anecdotal 
evidence that single-mandate agencies tend to foster a “dedicated 
but zealous” culture that is somewhat tone deaf to “the arguments 
and ideas of policymakers in other agencies as well as in the 
White House.”255 Hence, a quantitative study of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) elicited the view from within the agency 
that EPA staff tend to be focused “narrowly on environmental 
interests,” in contrast to the “broader perspective” taken by the 
White House.256 Even multiple-mandate missions tend to focus on 
one mission at the expense of others.257 Officials who favor the 
losing mandate are hardly inclined to hew unreservedly to the 
institution’s subsequent path. They are thus unlikely to evince 
institutional loyalty to the same extent. 
Finally, an institutional mandate may have a dynamic effect 
on the selection into and out of the institution. If an institution is 
renowned for its mandate, not only are officials with a prior 
commitment to that mandate likely to select in, but also, once 
embedded in the institution, they are more likely to make non-
transferable mandate-specific investments in expertise. This 
makes exit costlier. For example, if the EPA is known to maintain 
a commitment to combating climate change, rather than fostering 
polluting industries, it will be less likely to attract staff who are 
climate change skeptics.258 And vice versa. Officials hired will then 
redouble their epistemic investments to make the EPA’s mission 
(however conceived) a success. The result is a positive-feedback 
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mechanism by which the strength of an institutional mandate 
increases over time. 
In summary, how institutions are sliced up, whether by func-
tion or by subject matter, directly shapes the extent to which their 
officials tend to develop institutional loyalty. Insulation from 
synchronic partisan conflict, pursuit of an indivisible mission, and 
the elimination of plural conflicting mandates—all these are 
likely to conduce to sharper institutional loyalty. 
2. Diluting institutional mandates. 
Cultivating an institutional mandate, however, is not cost-
less. The channeling of political conflict into a single legislative 
forum, for example, is a central element of constitutional de-
sign.259 Even if Congress is, as a result of playing this function, 
unable to muster the same level of institutional loyalty as the 
executive, its role as a forum for routine partisan contestation is 
sufficiently important not to be derogated. There are a number of 
other design elements, however, that fragment institutional man-
dates and so undermine institutional loyalty in pursuit of other 
public values. The resulting trade-offs have not yet been identi-
fied. We consider the interaction of mandates with the “internal 
separation of powers”260 to illustrate such conflicts. 
Skepticism about the constraining effect of the separation of 
powers has induced some scholars to advocate alternatively for 
an “internal” separation of powers.261 The idea of an internal 
separation of power has an oxymoronic aspect. One prominent 
commentator suggests that they can be understood as mechanisms 
that “seek to achieve [the interbranch separation of powers’] goals 
by operating within the confines of a single branch.”262 Leading 
examples include the separation of adjudication from rulemaking 
or prosecutorial functions within administrative agencies, and 
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 260 See, for example, Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between 
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L J 423, 426–29 (2009); Katyal, 115 
Yale L J at 2319–25 (cited in note 6). 
 261 See Metzger, 59 Emory L J at 427–37 (cited in note 260) (describing examples of 
administrative structures that operate as an “internal” separation of powers); Katyal, 115 
Yale L J at 2316–25 (cited in note 6) (advocating greater internal separation of powers in 
the face of increasing congressional abdication). 
 262 Metzger, 59 Emory L J at 427–28 (cited in note 260). 
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the creation of “independent” agencies that exercise a measure of 
policy discretion free of presidential control.263 
Whether or not these design elements have independent jus-
tifications,264 it seems likely that their installation would dilute 
branch-level (and sometimes agency-level) institutional loyalty. 
Functional or policy mission–based distinctions within a branch 
foster plural, rather than unitary, understandings of a branch’s 
mandate. The very function of independent agencies, such as the 
Federal Reserve, is to create acoustic separation between short-
term partisan interests and longer-term systemic goals.265 Simi-
larly, “dissent channels,” which allow career bureaucrats to voice 
frustrations about an administration’s policy and which have also 
been championed as form of internal separation of powers, might 
have benefits in defeating groupthink.266 But because they have 
costs in terms of diluting institutional loyalty at the level of the 
branch, there is a trade-off between fostering loyalty to the 
branch as opposed to a subunit, such as an agency. 
Consider by way of example the decision of career diplomats 
within the State Department recently to use a dissent channel to 
challenge the Obama White House’s limited military deployment 
in the Syrian conflict.267 Their memorandum aired, and hence 
likely compounded, “deep rifts and lingering frustration” within 
the executive branch.268 The mere availability of a dissent channel 
undercuts pressure toward conformity on a single executive-
branch position.269 It hence acts as a friction on the formation of 
executive-oriented institutional loyalty. 
 
 263 Id at 429–30. 
 264 See Posner and Vermeule, 74 U Chi L Rev at 898 (cited in note 89) (arguing that 
an internal separation-of-powers proposal is “self-defeating”). 
 265 The Federal Reserve’s relationship to the White House is rather more complicated 
than the conventional story would suggest. See George A. Krause, Federal Reserve Policy 
Decision Making: Political and Bureaucratic Influences, 38 Am J Polit Sci 124, 135–40 
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 266 See, for example, Katyal, 115 Yale L J at 2328–29 (cited in note 6). 
 267 Mark Landler, 51 US Diplomats, in Dissent, Urge Strikes on Assad (NY Times, 
June 16, 2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/middleeast/syria-assad 
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 269 For example, the Syria dissent did not address the potential costs and risks of 
state collapse in Syria, a risk the US military prioritized. See id. 
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D. Social Networks 
Institutional loyalty is generated when officials are part of 
“social networks”270 that generate and reinforce commitments to 
an institution. That social networks influence the behavior and 
preferences of political officials and citizens is now “well estab-
lished empirically.”271 This is because “[p]eople frequently think 
and do what they think and do because of what they think rele-
vant others think and do.”272 This Section renders this intuition 
in slightly more formal terms, and integrates it with the literature 
on constitutional design, which has largely ignored the topic.273 
The social networks of government officials influence behavior 
and preferences through at least two pathways. First, networks 
shape the “epistemic community”274 in which officials operate.275 
Social networks help define the “argument pools” to which offi-
cials are exposed.276 Information diffuses quickly through social 
networks. The stronger the network, the faster the information 
diffuses, and the stronger its influence on argument pools.277 
 
 270 See Betsy Sinclair, The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior xi 
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 273 For an exception, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative 
Federalism, 118 Yale L J 1256, 1271 (2009) (discussing social networks in the cooperative 
federalism context). 
 274 For applications to government, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 Yale L J 2599, 2648 (1997); Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epis-
temic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 Intl Org 1, 4 (1992). 
 275 See, for example, Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: 
Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv L Rev 4, 42 (1983). 
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relationships. See Daniel J. Brass, Kenneth D. Butterfield, and Bruce C. Skaggs, Rela-
tionships and Unethical Behavior: A Social Network Perspective, 23 Acad Mgmt Rev 14, 
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Empirical studies of official behavior thus identify strong “peer 
effects” by which “bureaucrats’ responses to uncertainty turn less 
on supervisory instructions and more upon what they perceive 
peer bureaucrats to be doing.”278 
Second, internal social networks generate reputational costs 
for officials straying from an institutional orthodoxy. Networks 
reduce monitoring costs. It is cheaper to obtain and evaluate in-
formation about close colleagues or friends. These networks have 
proven important. The leading study of bureaucratic autonomy, 
by Professor Daniel Carpenter, identified such social networks as 
a critical tool for professional administrators, who used their 
alternative power base “in political and social networks” to reduce 
“their dependence on elected officials.”279 Social networks thus 
provide a way of collectively amassing and exercising power on 
something other than an ideological or partisan basis. In the early 
Republic, Chief Justice Marshall showed a canny awareness of 
that possibility by insisting that the justices all reside together in 
a boardinghouse. Marshall aimed “to use the camaraderie of 
boarding-house life to dispel dissent and achieve a one-voiced 
Opinion of the Court.”280 
With these mechanisms in hand, it is possible to pick out a 
number of ways in which institutional designers exploit or resist 
social networks to generate institutional loyalties. To begin with, 
numerous constitutional rules, conventions, and statutory rules 
are usefully understood as efforts to cultivate intra-institutional 
networks and tamp down on cross-institutional networks. The 
Incompatibility Clause of Article I, for example, states that “[N]o 
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a 
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”281 As 
Hamilton wrote in Federalist 76, if legislators were serving in the 
executive branch, there would be a constant source of “executive 
 
201, 204 (1983); Gabriel Weimann, The Strength of Weak Conversational Ties in the Flow 
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 278 Huq, 65 Stan L Rev at 48 (cited in note 220), citing John Brehm and Scott Gates, 
Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public 73–74 
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 279 Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy at 15 (cited in note 241). 
 280 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Supreme Court: A Place for Women, 32 Sw U L Rev 189, 
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influence upon the legislative body.”282 Analogously, the Supreme 
Court has recently implied that the Due Process Clause bars state 
and federal judges alike from deciding cases under the excessive 
influence of either legislative- or executive-branch actors.283 
Textual anti-networking rules are supplemented by weaker 
conventions.284 When Justice Abe Fortas was nominated to be-
come chief justice, he was defeated in part because of revelations 
of his close relationship with President Lyndon B. Johnson.285 
This generated an informal convention against the justices being 
an essential and close part of the network of senior officials within 
the other branches of government, motivated in part by a concern 
that such ties would compromise the institutional loyalty of the 
justices.286 This convention, though, is not as strong as a constitu-
tional rule. Hence, in 2004, when Vice President Cheney went 
hunting with Justice Scalia even as a case denominated with his 
name was before the Court, loud objections were raised by com-
mentators287 and by litigants.288 In contrast to Fortas, however, 
Scalia publicly defended his decision not to recuse himself by 
pointing out the mundaneness of cross-branch social networking. 
“Social contacts with high-level executive officials (including 
cabinet officers),” he explained in a letter to the Los Angeles 
Times, “have never been thought improper for judges who may 
have before them cases in which those people are involved in their 
official capacity, as opposed to their personal capacity.”289 It may 
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well be that this successful defense has eroded the post-Fortas 
convention somewhat. 
Consonant with Scalia’s defense, there are many ways in 
which the Constitution remains open to interbranch networks. 
For example, there is no Due Process Clause bar to executive or 
legislative influence on a coordinate political branch.290 If any-
thing, the Framers seemed more concerned about preventing of-
ficials sharing social networks with those in power in state gov-
ernments than preventing officials sharing social networks with 
those in other branches of the federal government. The creation 
of a new national capital beyond the control of state governments, 
for example, was meant to prevent federal officials from becoming 
too intertwined with state officials.291 
Other constitutional rules generate social networks that 
reinforce rather than reduce institutional loyalty. Providing the 
heads of institutions with strong control over their institutions 
can lead them to surround themselves with members of their social 
networks.292 Consider again Cheney’s defense of a unitary and pow-
erful executive branch.293 Cheney himself wielded unprecedented 
control over the operations of the Office of the Vice President, 
using this power to surround himself with friends and allies.294 
This personnel-related authority allowed him to translate ideas 
diffusing through his external social network about the merits of 
 
Jan 17, 2004), online at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jan/17/nation/na-ducks17 (visited 
Oct 21, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 290 We have almost nothing like a “due process of lawmaking.” See generally Hans A. 
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb L Rev 197 (1976). At the agency level, though, 
doctrines governing formal adjudications and notice and comment provide something at 
least comparable to due process for most executive actions. Kevin M. Stack, Agency 
Statutory Interpretation and Policymaking Form, 2009 Mich St L Rev 225, 234 (“[A] legal-
ity principle associated with due process imposes . . . constraint[s] on the considerations 
an agency may take into account in formal adjudication [and] in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.”). 
 291 Federalist 43 (Madison), in The Federalist 288, 289 (cited in note 3): 
Without [exclusive jurisdiction at the capital], not only the public authority 
might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted, with impunity; but a depend-
ence of the members of the general Government, on the State comprehending 
the seat of government for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring 
on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable 
to the Government, and dissatisfactory to other members of the confederacy. 
 292 See Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook, Birds of a Feather: 
Homophily in Social Networks, 27 Ann Rev Sociology 415, 435 (2001). 
 293 See notes 109–14 and accompanying text. 
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a powerful executive295 into institutional practice operationalized 
through an internal network of fellow travelers.296 External social 
networks, including law professors and other legal experts, 
helped aggrandize the branch’s authority. 
Institutions can also be part of wider professional social net-
works that cut across the public–private divide, and that police 
adherence to institutional norms while at the same time provid-
ing legitimation and public support. Elements of the “thick polit-
ical surround” can also feature institution-specific investments 
that would be endangered by official behavior that defies loyalty. 
Because officials are networked with these actors, they are 
exposed to pressure to conform to institutional norms, but also 
benefit from an extraneous source of political capital. 
Such networks are particularly robust in respect to the 
Article III judiciary; they help explain one of our motivating 
examples, Roberts’s decisive vote in NFIB.297 The chief justice, 
and the Court as a whole, is embedded in a larger social network 
of commentators, think tanks, scholars, and lawyers, largely 
located inside the Beltway.298 This network has been reinforced by 
the recent development of a powerful “Supreme Court Bar” 
comprising many leading national law firms.299 This diffuse net-
work is an important source of criticism, and hence social pres-
sure toward certain sorts of institutional behavior, sometimes 
epitomized (or caricatured) as the so-called “Greenhouse effect.” 
This is the alleged phenomenon “in which some Supreme Court 
Justices have drifted away from the conservatism of their early 
votes . . . towards the stated preferences of cultural elites, includ-
ing left-leaning journalists and the ‘liberal legal establishment 
that dominates at elite law schools.’”300 Although this purported 
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dynamic has a partisan flavor at present (at least in the accounts 
that circulate in the media), it is also possible that the justices’ 
integration into this network reinforces professional norms re-
specting legal craft and precision in ways that are nonideological 
in character. 
This social network also provides an important source of val-
idation and political support for the Court as an institution. The 
Court derives legitimacy and strength from this network—from 
the commentators on the left and right who routinely identify the 
Court as a vital national institution, from the many elite law 
firms that rely on it for prestige (and even business), and from the 
media that pay obsessive attention to the justices and their 
doings. In short, the Court’s social network provides ballast that 
both strengthens and also roots it to particular institutional 
practices and norms. 
* * * 
To summarize, some basic architectural choices about how 
branches and agencies are set up strongly shape the possibility of 
institutional loyalty. As we explore further below, institutional 
loyalty may or may not be desirable. To the extent it is thought 
desirable, though, the design decisions that conduce to shared 
institutional mandates should take it into consideration. 
III.  RECALIBRATING INSTITUTIONAL LOYALTIES 
We shift in this Part from description and analysis to a more 
normative stance. Having isolated the nature and importance of 
institutional loyalties, and their causal origins, we consider how 
individual officials’ loyalty within each branch might be usefully 
recalibrated. Our aim in this Part is to be illustrative, offering 
suggestions, rather than firm or final diagnoses. We hope to 
demonstrate that the recalibration of institutional loyalty is a val-
uable, yet to date underappreciated, mechanism for attaining 
larger constitutional goals. 
A measure of caution is counseled by the background com-
plexity of the separation of powers. That constitutional tradition 
is animated by multiple normative ambitions, including liberty, 
democratic accountability, and rule-of-law promotion.301 These 
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goals can and do clash.302 We do not aim to settle the profound 
normative questions of how to optimize these goals over compet-
ing constitutional ends across different contexts here. Nor do we 
tackle in this Article the difficult questions of which kinds of 
branch-level reforms are incentive compatible.303 Because our 
ambition here is to show the conceptual utility of institutional 
loyalty, we will put to one side process-related questions of how 
one gets from “here to there.”304 In short, the branch-by-branch 
illustrations of pathways for institutional reform that we offer be-
low should be taken as a “proof of concept,” not a strict agenda for 
institutional reform. 
Our analysis, moreover, makes no strong assumptions about 
the motives of an institutional designer. This raises an important 
criticism: Are we answering the question of how institutional 
dispositions arise by simply shifting the problem from the level of 
design to designer? What good does the identification of a toolkit 
do if adequate motivational foundations for designers are 
unavailable? There are, in fact, several reasons why institutional 
designers have good cause to consider how their choices influence 
officials’ dispositions. Most importantly, most designers want 
their institutional progeny to succeed. Official dispositions keyed 
to a particular institution are often necessary to the latter’s 
successful operation. Explaining the importance of a shared 
“corporate culture” among managers, Professor David Kreps has 
pointed out that culture furnishes focal points for the resolution 
of unexpected contingencies “in the minds of its hierarchical infe-
riors.”305 Investment in a joint (institutional) project also means 
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that external actors can confidently develop “stable expectations” 
about institutions’ likely behavior.306 
In addressing the utility of reforms that leverage institutional 
loyalty for each branch in turn, we begin by offering a hypothesis 
as to whether the branch is appropriately characterized by exces-
sive or insufficient incentives to heed the branch’s interests. We 
recognize that these baselines are controversial. Our purpose in 
specifying them, however, is to facilitate an analysis of the feasible 
design margins that can be recalibrated to generate institutional 
loyalties. Readers with a different normative prior should there-
fore attend to the lessons for institutional design, rather than our 
stipulated baselines. Having set a (provisional) normative base-
line, we then work from the causal pathways identified in Part II 
to recommendations for how the surfeit or deficiency of institu-
tional loyalty respectively might be mitigated. 
A. The Executive Branch’s Incentives Refocused 
Today, the executive branch exercises extensive policy au-
thority regardless of the party or the president in power.307 This 
authority is mediated through entities, such as the National 
Security Council and the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, that are able to cultivate high degrees of institutional loy-
alty via selective entrance rules, a complex civil-service regime, 
and the existence of durable career paths wholly within the 
federal government. The net result is that high-level executive 
personnel are generally characterized to a far greater degree by 
institutional loyalty relative to their congressional analogs. 
Hence, Article II–related loyalties are in no immediate risk of be-
ing crowded out entirely by partisan or ideological loyalty. If they 
are threatened at all, it is by loyalties to more granular units, 
such as departments and agencies.308 
We assume an executive characterized by strong institutional 
loyalty toward the branch as a whole, and even stronger loyalties 
to agencies and departments. Given this rough baseline, we 
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consider how institutional loyalties might be refocused toward 
the branch, rather than the agency or department, level, and, 
alternatively, how more government-wide preferences might be 
cultivated. We examine closely the merits of expanding on the 
rotation system that authorizes executive-branch officials to work 
outside of their usual institutional setting for a period of time.309 
Job responsibilities for all employees, including those in the 
executive branch, can be sliced and allocated using many differ-
ent tools. Executive-branch responsibilities can be bundled into 
permanent parcels (called “portfolios” in Washington speak) that 
are assigned to particular executive-branch officials. This is the 
normal practice in the executive branch, in which officials work for 
many years in the same offices with roughly the same portfolios—
with small exceptions.310 Civil servants in the executive branch 
tend to be promoted within the same agency or department in the 
executive branch, rather than moving between them. Political 
appointees tend to go “in and out” of the executive branch, rather 
than moving between agencies or departments within the execu-
tive branch.311 All this entrenches agency-level loyalties. 
In contrast, rotations within the executive branch mitigate 
loyalties that stop at the agency or department door. Federal law 
now recognizes executive job rotations but imposes numerous lim-
itations on them.312 The most reliable data produced by the federal 
government has also found a very small number of “detailees,”313 
the technical term for those detailed to another part of the execu-
tive branch or another branch entirely.314 The alumni of these 
rotations are not only likely to generate complicated institutional 
loyalties, but also to be effective in pursuing those complicated 
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loyalties. A number of empirical studies suggest that accrual of 
“specific human capital” in the form of relationships with other 
officials predicts “effectiveness in office.”315 
Job rotations within and between branches expand loyalties 
to the branch by leveraging several of the mechanisms identified 
in Part II. Entrance mechanisms, for example, can select for the 
detailees most likely to generate and manage loyalties to both 
their home and detailed institution. Detailees can be assigned to 
a new institution only if their home institution—usually at the 
highest level—agrees that a temporary assignment would be useful 
after the detailee returns.316 The new, temporary institutional em-
ployer must also approve the detailee, and sometimes must pay 
them out of their limited budget.317 These entrance mechanisms 
are essentially screening tools to identify those capable of the 
more complicated institutional loyalties that flow from detailing. 
An alternative approach is to vary employee assignments across 
time. Temporary task bundling (also known as “job rotation”318 or 
using a “Type Z organization”319) means assigning officials for 
short periods of time to distinct tasks.320 These distinct and 
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Facts, 155 J Inst & Theoretical Econ 301, 301 (1999) (describing job rotations as not as-
signing each worker “to a single and specific task but [instead] to a set of several tasks 
among which he or she rotates with some frequency”). 
 319 William G. Ouchi, Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese 
Challenge 32 (Addison-Wesley 1981) (“[L]ifelong job rotation [means] . . . a technician may 
work on a different machine or in a different division every few years, and all managers 
will rotate through all areas of the business.”). 
 320 This is sometimes called “job enlargement” in the labor economics literature. 
Eaton H. Conant and Maurice D. Kilbridge, An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Job Enlarge-
ment: Technology, Costs, and Behavioral Implications, 18 Indust & Labor Rel Rev 377, 377 
(1965) (describing this as “the practice of restoring to jobs some of the skill, responsibility, 
and variety that have been lost through work simplification”). 
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temporary tasks can be allocated to officials while these officials 
remain in their current positions.321 
Exit mechanisms can also encourage asset-specific invest-
ments in the home institution of the detailee, as well as in the 
potential future or actual present institution to which the official 
is detailed. Detailees invest in their home institution because 
they have a position there. Investing in that position will yield 
continued and potentially improved employment prospects there 
in the future. The cost of exiting a home institution, though, is 
mitigated by job rotations. Rotation creates new social networks 
and employment opportunities, mitigating the costs of exiting a 
home institution. Once a detail is arranged, moreover, the actual 
experience of working in a new institutional setting makes the 
possibility of exit more concrete, and hence less costly. 
The social context of the detailee is also transformed by their 
temporary assignment. There is a strong relationship between 
those with whom officials work and those who are the strongest 
nodes in their social networks.322 After a civil servant works for 
years for an executive-branch agency or department, these con-
nections within their agency or department can become even 
stronger. Political appointees, for instance, receive their executive-
branch positions because of their ties to other political elites who 
have been, are, or will be political appointees.323 
Rotations mean that networks are expanded to include those 
outside of their home institution. Upon returning to their home 
institutions, detailees are likely to have internalized many of the 
perspectives of the officials they added to their network from their 
 
 321 An example, by way of analogy, is found in L, which is the State Department Legal 
Adviser’s Office. L requires lawyers to rotate among issue divisions within that office. 
Lawyers might work first on a narrow question of international environmental law of 
concern to few within the executive branch, but then develop knowledge of international 
commercial arbitration, gaining expertise in a new issue and exposure to a distinct social-
network-sector salience. See Koh, 100 Georgetown L J at 1773 (cited in note 235) (“[O]ur 
[office’s] system of attorney rotation, which keeps lawyers in L for long tenures while 
allowing them to work on an ever-expanding set of issues, thus avoid[s] intellectual calci-
fication while maintaining institutional continuity and knowledge.”). 
 322 See McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 27 Ann Rev Sociology at 426–27, 431 
(cited in note 292). See also Jone L. Pearce and Amy E. Randel, Expectations of Organiza-
tional Mobility, Workplace Social Inclusion, and Employee Job Performance, 25 J Org Behav 
81, 86 (2004) (arguing that social inclusion in the workplace has a positive relationship to 
individual workplace performance). 
 323 See Gabriel Horton and David E. Lewis, Turkey Farms, Patronage, and Obama 
Administration Appointments *20–28 (Vanderbilt Public Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper No 09-19, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/A73K-2VUS.  
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temporary institutional homes. Scholars of employees in the pub-
lic sector have often found that “employees adapt their behavior 
consistent with the norms and expectations of people around 
them,”324 in “profound” and persistent ways.325 Going forward, 
newly networked officials become regular parts of the personal 
and professional network of the detailed official, generating loy-
alties to their temporary institutional home even after an official 
returns home. 
Job rotations within the executive branch can therefore be a 
tool used by those arguing for the need for a more holistic Article II 
perspective. The OLC, for instance, has been criticized by scholars 
like Professor Bruce Ackerman for being unduly loyal to the 
power of the president.326 OLC lawyers tend to move to other 
positions outside of the executive branch, such as becoming law 
professors, or move into the White House.327 An OLC lawyer who 
spent months working for the equally elite Office of the Legal 
Advisor in the Department of State might for instance be less 
skeptical of international-law constraints on presidential 
power.328 
Reformers could also use rotations to dilute an Article II ori-
entation. Executive-branch officials can be temporarily detailed 
to another executive-branch agency or department, or even to the 
legislative or judicial branch. Job rotations from the executive 
branch to the other branches in particular sensitize the executive 
branch to the legislative and judicial branches. The executive branch 
dominates the federal government, with more than 2.6 million 
employees.329 It should not be surprising that it is quite common 
in Washington to find executive-branch officials sharing social 
networks with entirely or almost entirely other executive-branch 
 
 324 Donald P. Moynihan and Sanjay K. Pandey, The Ties That Bind: Social Networks, 
Person-Organization Value Fit, and Turnover Intention, 18 J Pub Admin Rsrch & Theory 
205, 210 (2007). 
 325 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes 
in Administrative Organization xvi (Free Press 3d ed 1976). 
 326 See Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic at 152 (cited in note 
235) (describing the “lawlessness” generated by OLC deference to presidential priorities). 
 327 See id at 97; Fontana, 126 Harv L Rev F at 25–27 (cited in note 233). 
 328 See Fontana, 126 Harv L Rev F at 40–41 (cited in note 233). 
 329 See US Office of Personnel Management, Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics: 
The Fact Book *8 (2007), archived at http://perma.cc/TG6A-3JZS. 
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officials330—they are the overwhelming majority of officials living 
in Washington, after all. If officials are working on more, and 
more varied, issues, they are more likely to build more heteroge-
neous social networks that incorporate Congress, the federal 
courts, and even the private sector. These wider social networks 
may deflate past institutional loyalties not only because they 
change officials’ sources for information, but also because they 
serve as pathways to alternative, nonexecutive positions. 
There is evidence that earlier professional experiences in 
another branch of government generate loyalties to that branch 
that endure even after an official has moved on to another branch. 
Empirical studies have found, for instance, that federal judges are 
more likely to rule in favor of the executive branch if they have 
served in the executive branch earlier in their careers.331 Courts 
have also noted the complex loyalties held by those who have 
moved offices, characterizing such personnel as a blend of employ-
ees of their old institutions, employees of their new institutions, 
and independent contractors.332 There is every reason to believe 
that a recent job rotation would have roughly the same—or 
greater—loyalty-generating power as a professional experience 
decades earlier would have. The OLC lawyer who spends several 
months working for the Senate Judiciary Committee would have 
a different sense of presidential power than the OLC lawyer who 
never left the executive branch.333 
 
 330 See generally Ashley Parker, All the Obama 20-Somethings (NY Times, Apr 29, 
2010), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/magazine/02obamastaff-t.html (vis-
ited Oct 21, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (reporting on several apartments and 
homes in Washington shared by high-level Obama administration officials). 
 331 See Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some 
Republican Supreme Court Justices “Evolve” and Others Don’t?, 1 Harv L & Pol Rev 457, 
459–66 (2007); Rob Robinson, Executive Branch Socialization and Deference on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 46 L & Society Rev 889, 907–13 (2012). 
 332 See, for example, Judicial Watch, 412 F3d at 131–32: 
Although the district court acknowledged that, during their detail, the employ-
ees worked exclusively on NEPDG matters, were supervised by the Office of the 
Vice President, and did not occupy an office at the DOE, it appeared not to con-
sider those factors in deciding whether the detailees remained DOE employees; 
instead the district court appeared to rely solely upon the agency having paid 
their salaries. 
See also Schedule C and Other Details to the Executive Office of the President at *10–17 
(cited in note 313) (noting various factors to consider in evaluating whether a detailee 
works for a past or current institution). 
 333 Variation in institutional experience of this kind, indeed, might be made an infor-
mal criterion for hiring to the federal judiciary, especially at the appellate level, to promote 
a bench without asymmetrical sympathies. 
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Job rotations across branches, though, are rare. When they 
do happen, detailee traffic tends to be from the legislature (and 
sometimes the courts) to the executive—and rarely the other way 
around. Federal law authorizes detailing of executive-branch 
officials to House or Senate committees, but does not do the same 
for the personal staffs of members of the House or Senate.334 The 
relatively formidable power of the modern executive branch means 
that the attraction of working in the executive branch is substan-
tial. The polarized and despised Congress has a harder time attract-
ing talented staffers.335 Job rotations across branches right now, 
therefore, might well serve to spread the gospel about the im-
portance of executive-branch loyalty, rather than tempering it.336 
B. Judicial Ambition and the Rule of Law 
Institutional loyalties within the federal judiciary might be 
supposed an unfettered good insofar as they conduce toward 
“judicial independence” from the Congress and the executive 
branch.337 The implicit assumption of this view is that by negating 
the influence of coordinate branches, structural protections of 
judicial independence enable judges to exercise their independent 
judgment about what law (and law alone) requires. But this need 
not be so. Over the course of the twentieth century, the federal 
judiciary developed an unprecedented institutional heft and has 
successfully secured “important authority over key jurisdictional 
and administrative powers.”338 In a vivid display of an institu-
tional loyalty at work early in the twentieth century, Chief Justice 
William Howard Taft extensively lobbied Congress on behalf of 
 
 334 See 2 USC § 4301(f). See also Members’ Handbook and Committees’ Handbook, 
Detailees (House Administration, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ZM8H-JAJQ. 
 335 See Lee Drutman and Steven Teles, A New Agenda for Political Reform (Wash 
Monthly, Mar 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GK37-GLLV (“The federal government 
across all its branches has experienced a deterioration in its ability to acquire, process, 
and analyze information. But the problem is especially urgent in Congress, which is at the 
center of America’s current governing crisis.”). 
 336 See Detail Opportunity: OIRA’s Regulatory Exchange and Training Program 
(OMB), archived at http://perma.cc/CL6Q-DB8Y (“The purpose of this program is to help 
develop a cadre of agency experts in Executive Order regulatory review and planning, and 
to foster better cooperation among the agencies and OMB.”). 
 337 See Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211, 222 (1995) (“[T]he need for sepa-
ration of legislative from judicial power was plain [to the Framers].”); Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co, 458 US 50, 59 & n 10 (1982) (“The independence 
from political forces . . . helps to promote public confidence in judicial determinations.”). 
 338 Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 
65 Duke L J 1, 54 (2015). 
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the federal courts and secured to the Supreme Court almost 
unfettered discretion over its caseload, near-plenary authority to 
set its own agenda, and freedom to determine how and why it 
would intervene on matters of national salience.339 
Yet it is far from clear that the fruits of the discretion 
achieved by Taft and other advocates for the institutional judici-
ary necessarily promote useful constitutional ends. As Professor 
Pamela Karlan succinctly explains, “Judges should be independ-
ent, not so much so that they can conceive goals and policies of their 
own and realize them, but so that they can enforce the goals and 
policies embodied in the Constitution and the laws enacted by the 
democratic branches.”340 But, as one of us has argued, bipartisan 
coalitions of the Supreme Court have narrowed dramatically the 
range of constitutional remedies available to criminal defendants, 
prisoners challenging their convictions via habeas corpus, and or-
dinary citizens engaged in retail encounters with the state.341 The 
same trend can be observed in the context of statutory civil-rights 
remedies.342 That these restrictive transformations have a “long 
and bipartisan pedigree”343 is suggestive of their institutional 
roots: they reflect the judiciary’s institutional interest in stanch-
ing the flow of certain kinds of litigation.344 
As a consequence of institutional loyalties, individual rights’ 
holders are no longer able to vindicate entitlements through ex post 
remedies in federal court.345 Viewed in this light, institutional loy-
alties in the Article III context are, paradoxically, inconsistent 
with promotion of the constitutional rule of law and at odds with 
conventional notions of corrective justice and deterrence. 
 
 339 Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years 
after the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum L Rev 1643, 1660–84 (2000) (documenting these 
changes). See also generally Justin Crowe, The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political 
Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of William Howard Taft, 69 J Polit 73 (2007) (empha-
sizing the role of Taft’s personal efforts). 
 340 Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 Georgetown L J 1041, 1043 (2007). 
 341 For synoptic accounts of remedial contraction, see Huq, 65 Duke L J at 12–40 (cited 
in note 338); Sarah Staszak, No Day in Court: Access to Justice and the Politics of Judicial 
Retrenchment 31–34 (Oxford 2015). 
 342 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 Cal L Rev 1, 23 (2006) (noting “judges’ unwillingness to engage in rigorous scrutiny 
of [subjective-practices] business structures” in employment discrimination cases). 
 343 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil Rights?, 
114 Mich L Rev 893, 904 (2016). 
 344 Huq, 65 Duke L J at 63–67 (cited in note 338). 
 345 Ex ante remedies are unavailable for most retail constitutional wrongs, because 
most citizens cannot predict official action against them. 
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What might be done, then, to mitigate forms of judicial self-
regard with unwelcome implications for constitutional rights’ 
holders? Setting aside the pressing question of how such reform 
might occur, we develop one suggestion here in some detail. 
Since 1886, Congress has fashioned separate adjudicative 
mechanisms “for the bringing of suits against the Government of 
the United States.”346 In respect to remedies that can be granted 
through a freestanding adjudicative process—rather than, say, as 
incidental proceedings embedded within a criminal prosecution—
it would be desirable to create a specialized court staffed by an 
institutionally distinct cadre of judges. The advantage of such a 
bespoke cadre of judges is the fostering of a discrete and separate 
institutional mandate from that of Article III. Legislators might 
leverage the focal-point effect provided by a new jurisdictional 
statute, assigning cases to a discrete pool of judges separately and 
distinctly charged with the vindication of constitutional and civil 
rights. 
Congress might model this new judicial arm on the bank-
ruptcy bench, although a new “remedies bench” should have 
plenary Article III protection. The bankruptcy courts have suc-
cessfully exhibited “Article III values” as a consequence of a 
social-network effect—a “continued connection to an audience[,] 
the bankruptcy bar”—that “holds in high esteem professional, 
creative, and non-ideological resolution of complex disputes.”347 To 
leverage the same sort of social-network effect, Congress might 
employ an entrance rule—a requirement that appointees to this 
have litigated in the past on behalf of a constitutional right or a 
statutory civil right. In contrast to the current federal courts, 
which are dominated by former federal prosecutors,348 the result-
ing bench would come to public service already aligned to the 
institutional goal of providing remedies to individuals harmed by 
 
 346 Tucker Act, 24 Stat 505 (1887). See also United States v Mitchell, 463 US 206, 
213–15 (1983) (discussing the history of the Tucker Act, and treating it as a waiver of 
sovereign immunity); Richard H. Fallon Jr, et al, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System 896–904 (Foundation 7th ed 2015) (cataloguing various statutory 
waivers of federal immunity). 
 347 Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 
62 Stan L Rev 747, 752 (2010). 
 348 See Bob Egelko, Obama Nominations Heavy on Ex-Prosecutors (SF Chron, Feb 3, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/87JF-ACSY (noting that former prosecutors constituted 
45.7 percent of President Obama’s judicial nominees, 44.7 percent of President George W. 
Bush’s judicial nominees, 40.7 percent of President Bill Clinton’s judicial nominees, 37.3 
percent of President George H.W. Bush’s judicial nominees, and 40.8 percent of President 
Ronald Reagan’s judicial nominees). 
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the government’s unconstitutional or unlawful actions. It would 
also be entangled from the start in social networks in which the 
social value of individualized remediation for constitutional 
wrongs is well understood. 
We are, of course, under no illusions that Congress as cur-
rently constituted is about to expend effort on behalf of a dispersed 
and hardly high-status population of constitutional rights’ hold-
ers (although we are also of the view that legal scholars should 
not self-censor based on present political realities).349 Our point 
here is rather to demonstrate that the causal mechanisms we 
have identified in Part II—entrance and exit rules, institutional 
mandates, and social networks—have a continuing role to play in 
refining our federal institutions toward public-regarding consti-
tutional ends. 
C. Congress “Redivivus”? 
It is common ground that Congress today is characterized by 
a “radical separation between the two major political parties.”350 
Regardless of whether ideological bifurcation within Congress 
reflects changes in public preferences,351 there is a measure of con-
sensus today that a polarized Congress does not, and cannot, 
serve the nation well.352 Similarly, there is a widespread view that 
lobbyists possess too much influence in Congress, with many be-
lieving that special-interest bribery is just “[t]he way things work 
in Congress.”353 
 
 349 Bubb and Pildes, 127 Harv L Rev at 1678 (cited in note 304) (noting the “risks” of 
such an approach to scholarship). 
 350 Pildes, 99 Cal L Rev at 276 (cited in note 171). 
 351 Compare Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polar-
ization, and American Democracy 49–57 (Yale 2010) (arguing that polarization of elites 
drives legislative polarization), with Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, Culture War? at 19 (cited 
in note 93) (rejecting the popular polarization thesis). 
 352 For a representative version of this complaint in the legal academy, see Gillian E. 
Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum L Rev 1739, 1749 (2015) 
(decrying the “growing range of contexts in which a majority of legislators would prefer to 
alter the policy status quo but lack the numbers to overcome the objections of the President 
or a Senate minority”). For a related criticism of the accompanying gridlock, see Michael 
J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 Notre 
Dame L Rev 2217, 2218–19 (2013) (decrying legislative inaction in the face of a pressing 
need to make substantive policy decisions). 
 353 See CBS News/NY Times Poll—Congress, the Abramoff Scandals, and the Alito 
Nomination (CBS News, Jan 26, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/DT58-URN9; Lydia 
Saad, Americans Decry Power of Lobbyists, Corporations, Banks, Feds (Gallup, Apr 11, 
2011), online at http://www.gallup.com/poll/147026/americans-decry-power-lobbyists 
-corporations-banks-feds.aspx (visited Oct 21, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
76 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1 
 
These two popular diagnoses are not wholly consonant with 
one another.354 Nonetheless, they suggest broad agreement on one 
point: legislators are excessively motivated by partisan and ideo-
logical355 interests, perhaps as well as by pure pecuniary ones. 
Concomitantly, institutional loyalty seems in short supply on 
Capitol Hill. Scholars since Professor John Hart Ely have doubted 
Congress’s ability “to pull up its socks and reclaim its rightful 
authority” against the executive branch.356 Our analysis in this 
Section stipulates, as a baseline matter, an insufficiently institu-
tionally loyal legislative branch. How might the repertoire of 
design modifications canvassed in Part II inform efforts to reform 
a Congress of that sort? We develop a potential avenue of reform 
that employs many of the mechanisms we identified in Part II, 
although we are under no illusions about the intractability of the 
task. 
We focus on congressional staff, not legislators themselves. 
The legislature’s entrance and exit rules for such staff might be 
reformed to create an executive-branch-style congressional civil 
service durably disposed toward the institution of Congress.357 
Legal scholars focus on the optimal distribution of civil servants 
versus political appointees in the executive branch. The parallel 
question in the legislative-branch context receives scant atten-
tion. Scholars like Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman 
have started to fill this void by offering thick descriptions of 
congressional staffers’ beliefs and behavior.358 We build here on 
 
 354 On the one hand, Congress is viewed as excessively influenced by a single cabal of 
moneyed interests. On the other hand, Congress is perceived not as unified by any one 
interest, but as divided by the two-party system. If you think that Congress is both 
hyperpartisan and also in the grip of special interests, that is, your account of Congress is 
somewhat internally contradictory. 
 355 But see Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 Notre Dame L Rev 2065, 
2076–77 (2013) (arguing that parties have incentives to moderate positions over time). 
 356 John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its 
Aftermath 52 (Princeton 1993). 
 357 The call for something like a congressional civil service is at least seventy years 
old. See Thomas I. Emerson, Book Review, Reviews: Congress at the Crossroads. By George 
B. Galloway, 56 Yale L J 1094, 1094 (1947) (describing “well-handled hearings and [a] 
report” calling for more professional congressional civil service leading to some, smaller 
reforms). 
 358 See generally Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: 
Part I, 65 Stan L Rev 901 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman and Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory 
Interpretation from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, 
and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan L Rev 725 (2014). For an earlier, related article, with a 
smaller sample size, see Victoria F. Nourse and Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative 
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Gluck and Bressman’s impressive work by considering ways to 
strengthen staffers’ institutional loyalty. 
Constitutional doctrine already recognizes that congressional 
staff matter. As the Supreme Court has recognized, senators’ and 
representatives’ aides in particular possess a measure of author-
ity that rivals, and perhaps sometimes even surpasses, that of 
executive-branch officials.359 Elected officials in Congress spend 
large portions of their time on election-related tasks.360 They 
spend much of their time outside of Washington and hence away 
from the daily legislative activities in Congress.361 They hence de-
pend on staffers, who often act as their agents during intrabranch 
negotiations362 and as their conduit to constituents and lobbyists.363 
Because there are comparatively few staffers in Congress, each 
staffer can wield substantial power.364 The increasing complexity 
of policy, moreover, means that legislators as principals can 
imperfectly monitor the myriad choices staffers as agents are 
constantly making. 
 
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 NYU L Rev 575, 582–90 (2002). Political scien-
tists have been more interested in the congressional civil service. See, for example, 
Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of Rep-
resentative Government 11–24 (Basic 1980); Lee Drutman and Steven Teles, Why Congress 
Relies on Lobbyists Instead of Thinking for Itself (The Atlantic, Mar 10, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/TFA5-BT5H. 
 359 Gravel v United States, 408 US 606, 616–17 (1972): 
[I]t is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative 
process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative 
concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their leg-
islative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; that the day-to-day work 
of such aides is so critical to the Members’ performance that they must be treated 
as the latter’s alter egos. 
 360 See Philip M. Stern, The Best Congress Money Can Buy 118 (Pantheon 1988) (quot-
ing a member of Congress stating that around the times of elections he spends “eighty 
percent of [his] time” at fundraisers). 
 361 One report found that members were spending just 56 percent of their time in 
Washington. See Lisa Desjardins, Congress in D.C. Far Less Than It Used to Be (CNN, 
Aug 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/36RJ-EK27. Congress meets only about 140 days 
per calendar year. Members of Congress have fewer staff members in Washington relative 
to in their district offices than they used to previously. See Keeping Congress Competent: 
Staff Pay, Turnover, and What It Means for Democracy (Sunlight Foundation), archived 
at http://perma.cc/WV2Z-JCPV. 
 362 See Gravel, 408 US at 616–17. 
 363 Hasen, 64 Stan L Rev at 219 (cited in note 224); Barbara S. Romzek and Jennifer 
A. Utter, Congressional Legislative Staff: Political Professionals or Clerks?, 41 Am J Polit 
Sci 1251, 1271 (1997). 
 364 There are over two million executive-branch civil servants. See Recent Trends at 
*16 (cited in note 203). For every 200 to 250 executive-branch officials, there is 1 congres-
sional official. See Brookings, Vital Statistics on Congress *4 (AEI 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/U7TX-EY7N. 
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Empowerment, however, does not translate into an institu-
tional orientation. Congressional staffers are usually divided into 
one of two categories. There are “personal staff” who work for the 
representative or senator directly, and “committee staff” (often 
called “professional staff”)365 who work for the House or Senate 
committee. To begin with, the selection and promotion rules for 
staffers—including so-called professional staffers—do not conduce 
currently to positive loyalty toward Congress as an institution. 
Neither competitive examinations nor objective merit-related 
criteria are employed in hiring most congressional staffers akin 
to those used in the civil service.366 Aides instead are hired by 
representatives and senators based on their loyalty toward their 
immediate boss, their political party, and their ideology. Often, 
staffers are evaluated on the basis of past performance in the 
quite different context of a congressional campaign.367 The num-
ber of professional staff has been declining substantially over the 
years.368 Professional staff are usually hired through partisan net-
works anyway, with few exceptions. And while executive-branch 
civil servants are promoted based on criteria favoring the more 
institutionally disposed,369 most congressional staffers do not last 
long enough to be meaningfully promoted.370 An important excep-
tion, we note, is the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), one of the 
products of the 1974 framework budget legislation,371 and an insti-
tution expressly modeled on the executive branch’s operation.372 
 
 365 See Bressman and Gluck, 66 Stan L Rev at 728–29 (cited in note 358) (referencing 
the existence of “nonpartisan, professional staff” as a discrete category). 
 366 See notes 191–96 and accompanying text. 
 367 See Terry Carmack, How to Get a Job on Capitol Hill (Politico, Aug 4, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/QTA3-NSH2. 
 368 See Drutman and Teles, Why Congress Relies on Lobbyists (cited in note 358) 
(“[Speaker of the House] Gingrich cut committee staff by a third, reduced the legislative 
support staff by a third, and killed the Office of Technology Assessment.”). 
 369 See text accompanying notes 197–205. 
 370 Senate staffers work for the Senate for an average of five years. See Senate Staff 
Employment Data: 1991–2001 (Congressional Management Foundation), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2852-P3EJ. House staffers last even less time than that. See Craig Schultz 
and Richard Shapiro, 1994 U.S. House of Representatives Employment Practices: A Study 
of Staff Salary, Tenure, Demographics and Benefits *5 (Congressional Management 
Foundation, 1994), archived at http://perma.cc/TK6L-EFLW. Recall again that—with a 
real civil-service structure—executive-branch civil servants last several times longer than 
that. See Recent Trends at *17 (cited in note 203). 
 371 See text accompanying notes 160–64. 
 372 Mark S. Kamlet and David C. Mowery, The First Decade of the Congressional Budget 
Act: Legislative Imitation and Adaptation in Budgeting, 18 Polit Sci 313, 315–16 (1985). 
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Further, exit-related dynamics do not foster meaningful 
institutional loyalties to Congress. There are no intrinsic rewards 
to identifying with Congress as an institution. Congress remains 
much maligned by public opinion.373 Material returns to congres-
sional service are also low. Congressional staffers are poorly paid, 
work long hours, and usually can be removed at any time—most 
importantly when their elected boss retires or loses reelection.374 
Instead, staffers have rich exit options in both the executive 
branch and the private sector. For those driven by partisan or 
ideological goals, there are enormous returns to going to work for 
the executive, especially in comparison to the contemporary 
Congress.375 An executive-branch position may allow the former 
staffer to help draft regulations or litigate path-making cases. 
Both may carry more policy heft, and more intrinsic appeal, than 
legislative trench warfare. Private-sector lobbying positions, in 
contrast, offer not only the potential for influence, but also sub-
stantially higher salaries. Staffers routinely double their salary 
by defecting to the private sector.376 For staffers whose former 
bosses remain in office, lobbying work is especially lucrative.377 
This creates an incentive for earlier rather than later exit from 
public service. 
Compounding the institutional-loyalty deficit, congressional 
staffers do not organize around the singular institutional 
mandates that generate loyal officials in some agencies and 
departments in the executive branch.378 Congress has a broad and 
diffuse portfolio of responsibilities, not the focused portfolio of a 
single-mission institution.379 Members of Congress do not usually 
 
 373 For aggregate data, see Congress and the Public (Gallup), online at http://www.gallup 
.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx (visited Oct 21, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 374 See Schultz and Shapiro, 1994 U.S. House of Representatives Employment Prac-
tices at *5 (cited in note 370). 
 375 See David J. Samuels, Presidentialized Parties: The Separation of Powers and 
Party Organization and Behavior, 35 Comp Polit Stud 461, 462 (2002) (“Under presiden-
tialism, the possibility of capturing the executive branch . . . may become parties’ driving 
goal.”). 
 376 See Drutman and Teles, Why Congress Relies on Lobbyists (cited in note 358). 
 377 Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen, Revolving Door 
Lobbyists, 102 Am Econ Rev 3731, 3739–46 (2012) (finding that lobbyists who are former 
staffers lose, on average, about 25 percent of their salaries when their former legislative 
boss leaves office). 
 378 See Sierra Club v Costle, 657 F2d 298, 406 (DC Cir 1981). 
 379 See Gersen, 96 Va L Rev at 303 (cited in note 79) (“There is one Congress that 
exercises the legislative function for all policy domains rather than two Congresses, one 
for foreign affairs and one for domestic affairs. Functions are separated and substantive 
powers are bundled together within each function.”). 
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divide portfolios within their offices along discrete policy lines. 
Personal staff will cover a range of political and policy portfolios, 
and given the shortage of staff members, those dedicated to policy 
matters will usually have multiple and diverse policy issues in 
their portfolios.380 
Committee staff are unified by their nominal commitment to 
the mandate of their committee. Committee mandates, though, are 
(perhaps purposefully) broad.381 They might perceive themselves as 
part of the policy community that is within their committee’s 
jurisdiction—a lawyer for the Senate Judiciary Committee, for 
instance, feels part of the legal community. This is limited, 
though, because committee staffers that are hired and fired by 
majority or minority members will feel that their “mandate” is 
ultimately to serve whatever their member says, rather than to 
serve or shape a discrete policy mandate or professional community. 
Stronger institutional loyalty among congressional staff 
might be cultivated in several different ways. At the entry stage, 
the democratic accountability of members of Congress means that 
significant numbers of staffers are and should be hired by the 
members that will employ them. A larger number of positions, 
though, can be filled by professional staff working for committees 
than presently is the case. Committees do not feature staffers 
with sufficient institutional loyalties to power the institutional 
autonomy of Congress, but committee staffers are still at the 
greatest remove of any current staffers from the sway of elected 
officials.382 Civil-service examinations akin to those required for 
many executive-branch positions can be required to join commit-
tee staff. 
Alternatively, the relevant professional community can offer 
its evaluation of the professional competence of the potential 
staffer. For instance, the American Bar Association plays an 
 
 380 See, for example, Office of Representative Keith Ellison, Legislative Assistant 
Opening (Democratic Whip), archived at http://perma.cc/NEA7-CK4X; Office of Congressman 
Al Green, Job Announcement: Legislative Assistant (Democratic Whip), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3AGL-VPE2. 
 381 See, for example, Jurisdiction (Senate Committee on the Judiciary), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7NVM-ELNG (“In addition to its critical role in providing oversight of the 
Department of Justice and the agencies under the Department’s jurisdiction, including 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Judiciary Committee plays an important role in the consideration of nominations and 
pending legislation.”). 
 382 See Bressman and Gluck, 66 Stan L Rev at 729 (cited in note 358) (stating that 
“nonpartisan, professional staffers [ ] are not directly accountable to members”). 
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important role evaluating the credentials of judicial nominees.383 
It might also evaluate the credentials of those applying for a 
position on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Committee staffers 
might be approved only by a vote of either the other staffers 
and/or the members of the committee. This could lead to the 
selection of committee staffers on a partisan basis, just like other 
nominees that come to a committee vote. However, inducing par-
tisan warfare over committee staff generates an opportunity cost 
that prevents committees from dealing with more substantial 
issues engulfed by partisan warfare, such as judicial nominees. 
The more time spent debating the next committee counsel for the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, the less time available for debating 
the next nominee to the US Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. 
Modifying exit incentives for staffers would also help generate 
institutional loyalty. Stronger returns to remaining in Congress 
can also make a difference for congressional staffers. Congress 
enjoys the power of the purse, but opens that purse more to simi-
larly situated executive-branch officials than to their congres-
sional counterparts. A lawyer working for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)—even if that lawyer is not in a lead-
ership position at the SEC—can make over $200,000 a year.384 
The senior Democratic lawyer on the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
a veteran of several decades, made roughly 80 percent of that 
working on the nomination of then-Judge Neil Gorsuch to succeed 
Justice Scalia and determine the future of the Supreme Court.385 
Exit-related constraints on postemployment lobbying in the 
private sector, in particular in relation to issues on which a 
former staffer worked, would also shift the expected payoffs of 
exit versus continued service in Congress.386 The draw of working 
for the executive branch can be reduced by constraints on post-
employment opportunities in the other branches of government. 
Rather than staffers contemplating what will make them an 
 
 383 See Charlie Savage, Ratings Shrink President’s List for Judgeships (NY Times, 
Nov 22, 2011), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/us/politics/screening-panel 
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 384 See August Jackson, SEC Enforcement Lawyers’ Salary (Chron), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L2VC-RWHU. 
 385 Senate Judiciary Committee Salaries (Legistorm), archived at http://perma.cc/YV7C 
-NNWK (noting the salary of Bruce Cohen, a veteran of the Senate Judiciary Committee). 
 386 For a useful taxonomy of potential lobbying reforms, see Hasen, 64 Stan L Rev at 
237–40 (cited in note 224). 
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appealing candidate to a K Street lobbying firm or a presidential 
candidate or president, constraints on these opportunities upon 
leaving Congress will direct their attention toward the legislative 
branch. 
This reimagined congressional staffing model would also gen-
erate more of a focused institutional mandate. Staffers hired to 
pursue a discrete policy agenda for a committee would think of 
themselves as part of a legislative epistemic community. They 
would be evaluated and approved by their fellow committee 
members. They would also be evaluated and approved by related 
professional communities. Rather than considering what serves 
the electoral interests of the Chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, the staffer can consider what serves the interests of 
the rule of law and Congress’s role in defending it. 
Finally, the institutional dispositions of legislators and their 
staff might be promoted by narrowing the available scope for 
acting on pecuniary motives. Strikingly, the Supreme Court has 
recently expanded the scope for legislative self-serving. In its 
2016 McDonnell decision, the unanimous Court narrowed the 
scope of the “honest services” statute,387 which criminalizes fraud-
ulent deprivations of the “intangible right of honest services.”388 
Honest services charges are common in public-corruption cases.389 
The McDonnell Court held that the statute applied only when a 
defendant official “formal[ly] exercise[d] governmental power . . . 
similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination be-
fore an agency, or a hearing before a committee.”390 In part, the 
Court justified this narrowing gloss with the concern that a broad 
public-corruption law would “chill” interactions between constit-
uents and their elected representatives that ought to be protected 
by the First Amendment.391 McDonnell undermines efforts to cul-
tivate institutional dispositions because it widens the domain of 
 
 387 McDonnell, 136 S Ct at 2365. 
 388 18 USC § 1346. 
 389 A state or federal official can be charged with using the mail or wires to further a 
scheme to defraud citizens of their right to the fair, honest, and impartial services of their 
public officials. See Randall D. Eliason, Surgery with a Meat Axe: Using Honest Services 
Fraud to Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J Crim L & Crimin 929, 932 (2009) (explaining 
the statutory framework). See also Lynne Marek, DOJ May Rein in Use of ‘Honest Services’ 
Statute (National Law J, June 15, 2009), online at http://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/ 
almID/1202431433581/ (visited Oct 29, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (“[Honest services 
fraud] was the lead charge lodged by U.S. attorney offices against 79 suspects in fiscal 
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 390 McDonnell, 136 S Ct at 2372. 
 391 Id. 
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activity in which representatives can act on pecuniary, rather 
than institutional or public-regarding, reasons.392 In contrast, rep-
resentatives who are insulated from strong external pulls have a 
better chance to focus on institutional concerns. Our analysis thus 
provides a new ground for critiquing the McDonnell decision and 
favoring a broad public-corruption prohibition.393 
CONCLUSION 
Every organization struggles with how to ensure that its 
members act on behalf of its collective or corporate interests. The 
molding of atomized, selfish individual actors into committed 
institutional loyalists is therefore a problem of organizational 
design across academic fields and across our public life. In no 
domain of organizational life is this problem more important to 
consider, and more difficult to solve perhaps, than in the context 
of federal governmental design. When Madison anticipated the 
“interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional 
rights of the place,”394 therefore, his aspiration was not distinctive 
or different from that of many institutional entrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, scholars have struggled to visualize how a 
Constitution devised before the existence of—and without regard 
to—cohesive and polarized political forces and figures could con-
tinue to operate. The ensuing modern position is pessimistic. It 
implies that when the massive power of the federal government 
is in play, partisan, ideological, or selfishly material motives will 
 
 392 We bracket here the application of honest services fraud to gifts to a representa-
tive’s campaign or PAC, and focus on gifts that enrich a representative in her personal 
capacity. 
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dominate. Institutional concerns will trail in their wake. Our 
constitutional system works as it was supposed to only when what 
really motivates officials coincidentally overlaps with constitu-
tional principles. When partisan, ideological, or even crudely 
materialistic interests conflict with constitutional principles, 
damage is done to these principles. At a singular, extreme moment, 
or with gradual deterioration, this could mean the disappearance 
of these ancient and valued principles. 
We think this modern position can be supplemented. 
Branches, no less than private associations, can and do cultivate 
loyal, well-disposed officials capably motivated to act on the 
institution’s behalf. These “constitutional rights of the place” 
must be consciously cultivated by careful institutional design, 
and not simply assumed (or assumed away).395 To that end, we 
have identified and taxonomized four mechanisms capable of 
nurturing institutional loyalty. Properly deployed, these tools of 
institutional loyalty have the potential to play a meaningful role 
in ensuring that our national institutions operate as more than a 
blind crashing together of conflicting partisan forces. 
Madison was right that “parchment barriers”396 will not protect 
us when our “dependence on the people”397 produces the forces or 
figures that the modern position fears and that threaten institu-
tional boundaries. Our Constitution is not a “machine that would 
go of itself.”398 But Madison was also right that we are not without 
hope when ideological or partisan passions overwhelm fragile 
institutional boundaries.399 It is at those moments that our system 
includes within it other tools to ensure that institutional bounda-
ries persist and persevere. The ambition of this Article has been 
to demonstrate the importance and utility of institutional loyalty 
as one of these tools to ensure the constitutional machine still 
works even in moments of stress. 
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